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ABSTRACT
Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in commercial litigation funding.  Whereas
the judicial, legislative, and scholarly treatment of litigation finance has regarded litigation
finance first and foremost as a form of champerty and sought to regulate it through rules of legal
professional responsibility (hereinafter, the “legal ethics paradigm”), this Article suggests that the
problems created by litigation finance are all facets of the classic problems created by “the separa-
tion of ownership and control” that have been a focus of business law since the advent of the
corporate form.  Therefore, an “incorporation paradigm,” offered here, is more appropriate.
“Incorporating legal claims” means conceiving of the claim as an asset with an existence wholly
separate from the plaintiff.  This can be done by issuing securities tied to litigation proceed rights.
Such securities can be issued with or without the use of various business entities.  The incorpora-
tion paradigm also opens up the possibility of applying practices of corporate governance to litiga-
tion governance.
Indeed, in certain previously overlooked real-world deals, creative lawyers used securities tied
to litigation proceed rights as well as corporate governance mechanisms.  This Article analyzes
and then expands upon such instances of financial-legal innovation, suggesting how various
business entities can be used to deal with the core challenges presented by the separation of owner-
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ship of and control over legal claims: specifically, the problems of (1) extreme agency problems; (2)
extreme information asymmetries; (3) extreme uncertainty; and (4) commodification.
In addition, this Article discusses how incorporation of legal claims can reduce various costs
that litigation imposes in other transactions, such as mergers and acquisitions.
INTRODUCTION
The law and economics movement has revolutionized our understand-
ing of law by placing economic cost-benefit analysis at its center.  One of the
achievements of this movement, for better or worse, has been the conceptual
commodification of legal claims.  Currently, we are witnessing one of the
most breathtaking consequences of this turn in the history of legal ideas: the
rise of markets in legal claims, a phenomenon also known as “litigation
finance.”  Legal claims are being commoditized in the literal sense of the
word: they are being traded like other assets.
In recent years, legal scholars, regulators, and the media have focused
intensely on the visible segment of this new market: new investment firms,
such as Burford and Juridica, that invest in litigation by making capital con-
tributions covering litigation costs in return for a share of the litigation pro-
ceeds, should any be awarded (private equity litigation funding or PELF).
Indeed, it was the historically unprecedented going-public of Juridica and
Burford1 that launched the media frenzy,2 academic interest,3 and nation-
wide regulatory wave that has washed over the United States in recent years,4
1 Caroline Binham, Juridica Attracts Investment as the First Specialist Litigation Fund to
Float in UK, THE LAWYER (Jan. 14, 2008), http://www.thelawyer.com/juridica-attracts-invest-
ment-as-the-first-specialist-litigation-fund-to-float-in-uk/130705.article; Elisa Martinuzzi,
Burford Capital Amasses 80 Million Pounds in IPO (Update1), BLOOMBERG (Oct. 16, 2009, 5:20
AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aM4f5weps7UQ.
2 See, e.g., Mark Cobley, Sparkling Return for Buford as Litigation Investment Comes of Age,
FIN. NEWS (Jan. 11, 2014), http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2013-01-24/burford-capi-
tal-results-2012; Jennifer Smith, Litigation Investors Gain Ground in U.S., WALL ST. J., Jan. 12,
2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023038197045793166211315
35960.
3 See, e.g., Symposium, The Economics of Aggregate Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1641
(2013) (compiling articles that had previously been presented at a conference organized
by the Institute for Law and Economic Policy); Geoffrey McGovern et al., Third-Party Litiga-
tion Funding and Claim Transfer: Trends and Implications for the Civil Justice System, UCLA-
RAND CTR. FOR LAW & PUB. POLICY (2009), available at http://www.rand.org/content/
dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/2010/RAND_CF272.pdf (recounting the proceedings
of an academic conference discussing the implications of finance on civil justice); Clifford
Symposium “A Brave New World” Focuses on Litigation Finance, DEPAUL UNIV. COLL. OF LAW
(Apr. 18, 2013, 9:54 AM), http://depaullaw.typepad.com/depaul_law_school/2013/04/
clifford-symposium-a-brave-new-world-focuses-on-litigation-finance.html (noting that the
19th Annual Clifford Symposium on Tort Law & Social Policy will focus on litigation
financing); Northern Kentucky Law Review Symposium Focuses on Third-Party Litigation Finance,
N. KY. UNIV. (Feb. 2, 2011), http://nku.edu/display_news.php?ID=4307 (announcing the
topic of a symposium focusing on “how [litigation] financing functions and its ethical
implications”).
4 See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-3\NDL305.txt unknown Seq: 4  2-MAR-15 14:21
1158 notre dame law review [vol. 90:3
even though the trade in legal claims in the United States has been ongoing
for more than two decades.
Unfortunately, because of path dependence, the academic and regula-
tory analysis has been trapped in what I call a “legal ethics paradigm”: the
view that litigation finance, where legal, is an extension of the contingency
fee exception to the champerty doctrine (below) and the consequent regula-
tion of litigation finance via the champerty doctrine and the rules of lawyers’
professional responsibility.  This Article offers an alternative theoretical and
regulatory paradigm: the “incorporation paradigm,” according to which liti-
gation finance should be understood as a pocket of the finance industry
rather than an extension of the contingency fee.  According to this new para-
digm, commercial legal claims can and should be “incorporated” (as defined
in Section A below) in order to minimize or even resolve the concerns that
both proponents and opponents of litigation finance are seeking to solve
through the ethics paradigm.  These concerns (detailed below in Section B)
center on conflicts of interest, information asymmetries, risk, and commodifi-
cation (collectively, the Funding Challenges).  Indeed, perhaps the most rev-
olutionary aspect of reframing the debate in this way is that it helps
reconceive of the Funding Challenges—which occupy in some form or
another most of the scholarship and public debate surrounding litigation
finance—as an instance of the familiar problem of the separation of owner-
ship and control, a problem at the heart of corporate law.5  The problem of
the separation of ownership and control is the problem of understanding the
survival—or in our case, the emergence—“of organizations in which impor-
tant decision agents do not bear a substantial share of the wealth effects of
their decisions.”6  Indeed, decision agents may even seek to line their own
pockets and engage in self-dealing at the expense of the owners.  Since Adam
Smith first raised the problem of the separation of ownership and control in
The Wealth of Nations7 more than two centuries ago, the practice and law of
business entities has made great strides in understanding and controlling the
associated problems (though certainly not eliminating them altogether).
The theoretical argument for a paradigm shift rests on a description and
analysis of deals—that have heretofore been overlooked by scholars—in
which creative merger and acquisition (M&A) lawyers have incorporated
legal claims, and argues that this practice can replace existing practices
5 See REINIER R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 21–71 (2004)
(discussing agency problems in corporate law and the governance structure that aims to
mitigate these problems); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and
Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 301 (1983) (seeking to explain the survival of organizations
characterized by separation of ownership and control and characterizing that enigma as “a
problem that has bothered students of corporations from Adam Smith to Berle and Means
and Jensen and Meckling”).
6 Fama & Jensen, supra note 5, at 301.
7 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
(Edwin Cannan ed., Modern Library 1994) (1776).
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through which ownership and control of legal claims are traded, in whole or
in part, in the litigation finance context.
The incorporation paradigm also calls for extending financial regula-
tions, not the regulation of attorneys, to regulate the litigation finance indus-
try.  By better solving the Funding Challenges, the incorporation paradigm
should increase both acceptance of litigation finance and liquidity of legal
claims, and in turn increase access to justice.
Finally, while the argument focuses on solving problems plaguing litiga-
tion finance, incorporating legal claims has important implications in the
corporate context for three reasons.  First, because it reduces what I call “hid-
den costs,” sometimes prohibitive, that litigation imposes on mergers, acqui-
sitions, and major equity investments in certain (uncommon but important)
scenarios.  Second, because spinning off large litigations into Special Purpose
Vehicles (SPVs) can create accounting benefits for corporations.  And third,
because simplifying and reducing the costs of litigation finance of large com-
mercial claims by incorporating them may encourage corporations and gov-
ernments to pursue claims that currently go unprosecuted.
Part I describes the rise of litigation finance, the ethical concerns it
raises, the ethical constraints currently imposed upon it through the legal
ethics paradigm, and the economic inefficiencies caused by the simultaneous
over- and under-regulation of litigation funding under the legal ethics para-
digm.  Part II presents a set of deals in which corporations have used business
entities (Delaware statutory trusts) and various types of securities to reduce
the hidden costs of litigation and facilitate corporate transactions, as well as
two deals where incorporation presented itself in the litigation finance con-
text.  After describing these complex and innovative deals, Part III general-
izes from the deals how incorporation can minimize (or exacerbate if
misused) the Funding Challenges.  It then outlines a broader vision of how
corporate entities other than statutory trusts can be used to solve both the
problems of the hidden costs of litigation and facilitate efficient and ethical
trade in commercial claims.  This Article concludes with some remarks on
further implications of the incorporation paradigm that can be explored in
future works such as the idea of “litigation governance,” modeled on corpo-
rate governance, and the question of the proper regulation of litigation
finance arrangements understood as securities and, more generally, as finan-
cial products.
A. The Legal Ethics Paradigm and Its Limitations
Currently, liquidity of legal claims is greatly hampered by the fact that
the mechanics of claim trading are placed in a straitjacket woven out of anti-
quated doctrines and rules (described below) that are aimed at regulating a
relationship different in kind.  This legal ethics paradigm rests on a flawed
analogy between the contingency attorney-client relationship and the finan-
cier-financed relationship:
Because the similarities between attorney funding and third-party fund-
ing are extensive, most of the discourse surrounding litigation funding is
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characterized by what some economists call an “attribute substitution”: a cog-
nitive bias whereby individuals who need to make a complex judgment—
here, regarding the desirability of the novel phenomenon of litigation
finance—substitute that complex judgment for a more easily calculated heu-
ristic.  In our case, the easiest calculation is the desirability of contingency
fees.  In other words, commentators simply apply their preconceived views of
contingency fees to litigation finance.8
The substitution is understandable.  As discussed below, there are
indeed important similarities between the concerns that arise in the context
of the contingency attorney-client relationship and that of the funder-plain-
tiff, including (1) extreme agency problems (conflicts of interests); (2)
extreme information asymmetries; (3) extreme uncertainty; and (4) inappro-
priate commodification—namely, doing away with nonmonetary relief.9  But
while contingency lawyers do provide financing, they primarily provide lawy-
ering services.  They are officers of the court, with privileges conferred by the
courts and by society at large and corresponding obligations to those constit-
uencies, and are therefore subject to an elaborate regulatory regime embod-
ied in the codes of professional responsibility.
Conversely, funders are financiers only.  The current direct and indirect
regulation of litigation finance, through common law doctrines such as
champerty (direct) and legal ethics (indirect) should be radically revised to
reflect economic reality.10  That reality, as the deals described below exem-
plify, is that sophisticated plaintiffs and funders are best understood as co-
venturers—or, in other words, as business partners (as the term “partners” is
used colloquially).  Consequently, they can adopt existing deal structures, use
legal entities and the regulations that govern them, as well as contractual
8 Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 1268, 1293 (2011) (footnote omitted).
9 These problems as they present themselves in litigation finance have been discussed
at length in Maya Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455
(2012) (arguing that litigation finance is analogous to venture capital because it is similarly
characterized by extreme agency costs, extreme information asymmetry, and extreme risk,
for similar reasons, and that these problems can be minimized by adapting solutions from
venture capital).  A detailed discussion of the specific conflicts of interests created by the
tripartite attorney-client-funder relationship is available in Steinitz, supra note 8, at 1294.
10 This, in turn, implies a normative argument that litigation finance is a positive
development.  For normative arguments favoring litigation finance, see, for example,
Michele DeStefano, Nonlawyers Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen or Stone
Soup?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2795 (2012) (arguing that “the time has come to rethink
the U.S. legal profession’s rules and structures that were designed to narrow exposure to,
and influence by, lawyers”); Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of
Champions or a Market for Champerty?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 668–696 (1995) (examining
the costs and benefits of lawyer-funded and nonlawyer-funded litigation).  Reasonable
minds certainly differ, however.  Views opposing litigation funding include, for example,
John Beisner et al., Selling Lawsuits, Buying Trouble: Third-Party Litigation Funding in the
United States, U.S. CHAMBER FOR LEGAL REFORM, Oct. 2009, at 4–11, available at http://
legaltimes.typepad.com/files/thirdpartylitigationfinancing.pdf (discussing “the problems
inherent in third-party litigation financing”).
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mechanisms including corporate governance mechanisms developed
through the practices and laws of business entities in order to avail them-
selves of built-in solutions to the Funding Challenges.
These can and should replace the ethics paradigm which both over- and
under-regulates litigation finance.  Legal ethics overregulates in that it leads
to the prohibition of joint ventures (between plaintiffs and funders) that
most would find inoffensive, indeed facilitative of access to justice as can most
clearly be seen in “David v. Goliath” disputes between tech startups with no
resources to pursue patent infringements, on the one hand, and established
industry incumbents that infringe, on the other.  Legal ethics underregulates
in that it does nothing to deal with the problems of finance, e.g., by requiring
that funders be adequately capitalized, registered, and licensed; mandating
appropriate disclosures to the investors in PELF; controlling for the moral
hazard that creating litigation-backed securities might create in the future;
imposing fiduciary duties and duties to fund; and more.
In short, expanding the practice of incorporating commercial legal
claims beyond the M&A context to the litigation finance context can help
minimize or even solve some of the key problems identified by scholars of
litigation finance.  Once such problems are addressed, litigation finance—
currently suspect by lawyers, judges, legislators, and investors—may face less
resistance and consequently expand, allowing more meritorious claims to be
litigated than otherwise would be and solving the problem of the value
destruction caused to plaintiffs by meritorious claims that go unremedied.
Corporations, which are generally conservative about suing, are currently
experiencing value destruction in the form of unprosecuted claims.  To the
extent their claims are not prosecuted because of the difficulty in ascertain-
ing value, the difficulty in ascertaining the likelihood of success in prosecut-
ing meritorious claims, negative accounting treatment during claim conduct,
unfavorable tax treatment, and because of the cost of the capital that would
be used to prosecute a claim (including opportunity costs), a more vibrant
and liquid litigation finance market may provide access to justice.  Sover-
eigns, domestic as well as foreign, are another type of sophisticated owner of
large-scale claims that face the same kind of analysis when deciding whether
to pursue litigation.  Additionally, in the case of sovereigns, such decisions
are subject to public scrutiny and using public funds to pursue speculative
litigation may not be a popular decision.  Here, the value destroyed from
having to forgo litigation is a foregone public resource.
Recognizing the full commodification of claims created by their incorpo-
ration and a liquid market in claims, I draw one major limit: I exclude from
consideration the incorporation of noncommercial claims.11  Commercial
11 American litigation finance serves two different markets.  One is consumers bring-
ing personal claims sounding, e.g., in torts, matrimonial, or workers’ compensation law,
who need bridge financing while their attorney delivers a settlement or judgment.  The
other is corporations, many repeat players, that want the money to pay the litigation’s
expenses so they can free up the capital for operations, or that are faced with a claim too
big for them to bring without financing.  The public policy concerns are quite different, in
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claims, more than all others, involve damages that can be remedied through
monetary compensation.  When a claim’s natural remedy is monetary, com-
modification does not distort justice.  In all other instances, however, the
drive toward commodification can distort justice.  While this Article will iden-
tify ways to ameliorate this dynamic through deal structure at bottom, inju-
ries that call for nonmonetary remedies need to be sheltered from
commodification.  Thus for the purposes of cleanly demarcating the incorpo-
ration of claims and its benefits, I exclude noncommercial claims.
B. Incorporation of Legal Claims
The market in legal claims is much vaster and older than the discourse
on commercial litigation finance recognizes.  As this Article documents, long
before the emergence of PELF, companies advised by creative lawyers have
experimented with trading in legal claims by incorporating them.  Specifi-
cally, by “incorporation” of a claim, I am referring to a practice of giving the
claim a legal existence separate from the plaintiff, thus making it an asset
that can be sold.  There are two archetypical ways to incorporate claims,
which I will call loose and strict.
“Loose incorporation” means embodying the value of the litigation in a
security, which, until claim resolution, derives value solely from the expected
value of the litigation and at claim resolution has a fixed value that is con-
veyed to the security holders.  Placing the claim in the “corpus” of a security
is “incorporation” in a loose, literary sense only.  “Strict incorporation”
involves creating an SPV to embody the claim and/or its proceeds and is a
literal usage of “incorporation,” though it is not intended to connote that
corporations are the only or even most appropriate legal entities for this pur-
pose.  When strictly incorporating, the SPV may issue securities, but that is
not a definitional constraint.
Claim incorporation can address the issues raised by separation of own-
ership and control in two basic ways: by contract and by the statutory and
common law that come with the different forms of SPV.  Regardless of which
of the possible forms the incorporation takes, claim incorporation forces the
transparent allocation of ownership and control as people will not buy a liti-
gation-backed security without disclosure as to how the litigation will be man-
aged.  Even without a security, SPVs by their nature require structuring the
funder-plaintiff-claim relationship.
Examples of both loose and strict incorporation are discussed in Part II.
Nearly all of the examples are of deals done in the 1990s to solve merger-
pricing problems created by litigation.  In those deals the claims were so
large and hard to value that the parties could not agree on what the target
that consumers have less bargaining power and sophistication and therefore need more
protection; personal claims are not always resolvable with cash alone, and the contracts
involved are totally different.  While consumers can enter form contracts, commercial
claims are always negotiated deals.  For a review of consumer lending literature, see infra
note 18.
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was worth.  So the target spun off the value of the claim to its shareholders,
and the deal priced without consideration for the claim.  The spun-off securi-
ties traded on the NASDAQ12 (for the most part), and thus the target’s share-
holders were able to realize immediate value and the pricing problem was
solved by the market’s pricing of the shares.  That, in turn, allowed strangers
to the claim to own the right to some claim proceeds.  Claim incorporation
was born.
While most of the deals arose in the M&A context, each explicitly con-
templated the possibility of issuing additional securities to finance the litiga-
tion and their structures are well-suited for usage directly for litigation
finance.13  In addition, two other examples of strict incorporation come
directly from the litigation finance context.  One was contractually agreed to
but apparently never created.  The other came about in the legally distinctive
bankruptcy context, and the claim’s incorporation in that case was inadver-
tent rather than intentional.  It is appropriate to speak of that claim as incor-
porated simply because the facts leading to the bankruptcy so stripped the
company of value that its sole remaining asset was its multibillion dollar
claim.  Importantly, that litigation finance deal involved the formal allocation
of ownership and control through the medium of both the plaintiff’s corpo-
rate form and by contract.
I. LITIGATION FINANCE AS A SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND HOLE AND THE
INHIBITION OF LIQUIDITY IN LEGAL CLAIMS
A. The Rise of Litigation Finance and the Liquidity in Legal Claims
Recent years have seen an explosion of academic interest in commercial
litigation funding, which is regarded as a new phenomenon in the United
States.14  The timing of the public awareness in academia and in the finan-
12 See infra Part III.  In addition, some litigation finance firms are publically traded: the
Australian IMF is traded on the Australian exchange, and Juridica and Burford are traded
on London’s AIM exchange.  John O’Doherty, Litigation Fund Poised for AIM Debut, FIN.
TIMES (LONDON), Oct. 17, 2009, at 14.  As such, conceptually, their shares are securities of
pools of litigations.  Interestingly, Professor Stephen Yeazell used the idea of a “NASDAQ
for lawsuits” in his argument in favor of pricing transparency in the market of civil suits’
settlements.  Stephen C. Yeazell, Transparency for Civil Settlements: NASDAQ for Lawsuits?, in
CONFIDENTIALITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND THE U.S. CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 143 (Joseph W.
Doherty et al. eds., 2012).
13 Whether it is possible to do an IPO, rather than a spinoff, of litigation proceed-
backed securities is an open question, as underwriters may reject participating in such a
deal.  However, securities could still be privately placed. See Richard Painter, The Model
Contract and the Securities Laws, Parts I–IV, A MODEL LITIG. FIN. CONTRACT (July 15–25,
2013), http://litigationfinancecontract.com/tag/richard-w-painter/.
14 See, e.g., Steven Garber, Alternative Litigation Financing in the United States: Issues,
Knowns, and Unknowns, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE (2010), http://www.rand.org/con-
tent/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP306.pdf; Stephen Gillers, Wait-
ing for Good Dough: Litigation Funding Comes to Law, 43 AKRON L. REV. 677 (2010); Deborah
R. Hensler, Financing Civil Litigation: the US Perspective, in NEW TRENDS IN FINANCING CIVIL
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cial, trade, and general media is probably due to the launch of two publically
traded litigation finance firms: Juridica in 2008 and Burford in 2009.15  It
appears, however, that some private entities have been funding commercial
cases in the United States for at least a couple of decades, either ad hoc, in
the case of certain hedge funds, or through specialized private firms that
simply did not catch the eye of the financial media or the academy.16  Since
the high-profile launch of Juridica and Buford, a number of privately held
litigation firms have emerged including Bantham Capital, BlackRobe Capital,
Fulbrook Capital, Themis Capital, and Gerchen Keller Capital LLC to name
a few.17
Moreover, the current commercial litigation funding industry, variously
referred to as third-party funding, alternative litigation funding, litigation
investment, and more, was preceded by a number of closely related practices.
The first wave of litigation funding, broadly defined, included the law lend-
ing industry, also known as consumer litigation funding, and encompassed
the financing of personal claims such as personal injury and workers’ com-
pensation.18  Also included in this wave was the rise of the so-called “IP
trolls”;19 a market in bankruptcy claims (corporate debt);20 a market in Inter-
national Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) awards (sov-
ereign debt);21 and the rise of various forms of alternative funding—
including that of class actions—in the pioneering jurisdictions of the United
LITIGATION IN EUROPE 149 (Mark Tuil & Louis Visscher eds., 2010); Jonathan T. Molot,
Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65, 73 (2010).
15 See BURFORD CAPITAL, http://www.burfordcapital.com/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2014);
JURIDICA ASSET MGMT., http://www.juridica.co.uk/about.php (last visited Dec. 31, 2014).
16 This is based on communications the author received in association with her web-
based research project, A MODEL LITIGATION FINANCE CONTRACT, http://litigationfinance
contract.com.
17 See BENTHAM ASSET MGMT., http://www.benthamam.com.au (last visited Dec. 31,
2014); FULBROOK CAPITAL MGMT., LLC, http://www.fulbrookmanagement.com (last visited
Dec. 31, 2014); GERCHEN KELLER CAPITAL, LLC, http://www.gerchenkeller.com (last visited
Dec. 31, 2014); THEMIS LEGAL CAPITAL, http://www.themislc.com (last visited Dec. 31,
2014).
18 See Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Plaintiffs’ Lawsuits: An Increasingly Popular (and
Legal) Business, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 57, 79–83 (1999) (describing litigation support
firms); Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime Industry That Has a Place
in the United States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 83, 86–87 (2008) [hereinafter Martin, Litigation
Financing] (giving background information about the litigation financing industry); Susan
Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West of Finance Should Be Tamed Not
Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55, 67–68 (2004) (same); Julia H. McLaughlin,
Litigation Funding: Charting a Legal and Ethical Course, 31 VT. L. REV. 615, 618–24 (2007)
(describing what litigation-funding companies are).
19 See, e.g., Peter N. Detkin, Leveling the Patent Playing Field, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 636, 636 (2007) (discussing the market in patent claims).
20 Robert D. Drain & Elizabeth J. Schwartz, Are Bankruptcy Claims Subject to the Federal
Securities Laws?, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 569, 571–75 (2002) (discussing the market in
bankruptcy claims).
21 See generally PIA EBERHARDT ET AL., PROFITING FROM INJUSTICE: HOW LAW FIRMS, ARBI-
TRATORS AND FINANCIERS ARE FUELLING AN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION BOOM (Helen Burley
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Kingdom and Australia.22  Lastly, related financial products such as litigation
insurance for plaintiffs and after-the-event insurance for defendants have
been available in foreign jurisdictions for some time including, respectively,
Germany and the United Kingdom.23
The first wave of litigation finance has led to some regulatory efforts—
with state-level legislation24 and some investigations by state attorneys gen-
eral25—as well as an expansion of the market. This expansion included new
“asset classes” such as divorces26 and the rise of dedicated commercial
funders (including publically traded ones) described above.
With public awareness and attendant growing demand for litigation
funding, as well as a lot of research and development of new financial prod-
ucts by existing and startup litigation funding firms, we are now witnessing a
third wave of litigation funding in the United States.  One development char-
acteristic of this third wave is that commercial funders are emboldened to
seek overt control and not mere influence over the litigations they invest
in.27  Under this revised business model, funders seek to enhance the value
ed., 2012), available at http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/profiting
frominjustice.pdf (discussing the market in ICSID claims).
22 See CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL, IMPROVED ACCESS TO JUSTICE—FUNDING OPTIONS & PRO-
PORTIONATE COSTS 53–66 (2007), available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/related-offices-
and-bodies/advisory-bodies/cjc/costs-and-funding/ (describing the recent acceptance of
third-party litigation funding in Australia and the United Kingdom). See generally Hensler,
supra note 14 (providing a transatlantic perspective on financing civil litigation).
23 Marie Gryphon, A Loser-Pays Model Would Make the Civil Courts System a Winner, MAN-
HATTAN INST. (Dec. 5, 2008), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/miarticle
.htm?id=3489#.VE3XEovF9CM.
24 Legislation to regulate at least some types of litigation funding is currently pending
before three state legislatures—Indiana, Oklahoma, and Mississippi.  S.B. 378, 2013 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013); H.B. 503, 128th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2013); S.B. 2378,
128th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2013); S.B. 1016, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2013).  A 2010
Delaware House Bill passed out of committee, but went no further.  H.B. 422, 145th Gen.
Assemb. (Del. 2010).  Three other states—Maine, Ohio, and Nebraska—have already
passed legislation regulating litigation financing. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, §§ 12-101 to
-107 (2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (West 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-3301
to -3309 (West 2014).
25 Several consumer financing companies doing business in New York have entered
into a stipulation with the Attorney General of New York that requires the law lending
firms that are members of the American Legal Finance Association to follow certain guide-
lines. See Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to Executive Law § 63(15) at 3, Att’y Gen.
of the State of N.Y., In re Levine Leichtman Capital Partners, (Investigation No. 2009-124)
(announcing agreement whereby Levine Leichtman vows to follow the Reform Code of
Conduct stipulated by the Attorney General).
26 See Binyamin Appelbaum, Taking Sides in a Divorce, Chasing Profit: Firms Cover Legal
Cost for Cut of Winnings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2010, at A1 (discussing the practice of funding
divorce proceedings in exchange for a share of the winnings).
27 See Selvyn Seidel, Time to Pass the Baton?, FULLBROOK MGMT. (Nov./Dec. 2012),
http://www.fulbrookmanagement.com/time-to-pass-the-baton (discussing the control doc-
trine in the context of third-party funding).  Sean Coffey, the principal of the litigation
funding firm BlackRobe Capital Partners (now dissolved) termed this “litigation 2.0.”  His
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of their investment by actively managing them, as is done in more traditional
asset classes.  Another characteristic is that new market entrants have posi-
tioned themselves as providing methods of corporate finance for businesses
that could otherwise afford to bring claims,28 and incumbent market partici-
pants have added such products to their offerings.29  Other new financial
products include law firm financing30 and defense financing.31
B. The Concerns Raised by Litigation Finance
Most of the literature relating to litigation funding has focused on the
ethical challenges and archaic regulations that stand in the way of litigation
funding.  Such regulations prohibit litigation funding in certain states, and in
others, raise its costs and constrain its users into financial arrangements with
convoluted structures that operate in a legal gray zone.  Concern regarding
litigation funding emanates, in part, from the historic perception that litiga-
tion is a necessary evil to address personal harms (termed “authentic
claims”).32  The corollary to this perception is a historic distaste of officious
intermeddling by nonparties, especially for a profit.33  The broadest prohibi-
explanation for the shift is that when Juridica and Burford sought to go public, their deal
advisors were unsure that funding which involves control of the litigation is permissible
and so those entities sought a more conservative approach than the privately held entities
that followed in their footsteps.  Sean Coffey, Commentator, Black Robe Capital Partners,
LLC, Address at the Institute for Law & Economic Policy 19th Annual Symposium, The
Economics of Aggregate Litigation: Rights & Obligations in Alternative Litigation Financ-
ing (Apr. 12, 2013).
28 See generally What We Do, GERCHEN KELLER CAPITAL, http://www.gerchenkeller.com/
what-we-do/overview/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2014) (stating that the company “provides stra-
tegic capital to sophisticated companies and the leading law firms that represent them”).
For plaintiff services specifically, see Benefits to Claimholders, GERCHEN KELLER CAPITAL,
http://www.gerchenkeller.com/what-we-do/benefits-to-sharehoders/ (last visited Dec. 31,
2014) (listing and describing benefits).
29 As this Article goes to print, an innovative form of funding, in which the funding
firm provided a plaintiff with a conventional recourse loan with a contingent right to
receive a portion of an arbitration award, was announced.  The funds were spent on the
plaintiff-corporation’s business needs, rather than litigation costs. See Burford Capital
Receives $26 Million from Innovative Corporate Debt Facility Backed by Arbitration Claim, BURFORD
CAPITAL (June 3, 2014), http://www.burfordcapital.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/
2014-06-03-BUR-Rurelec-press-release-Final.pdf; Jan Wolfe, Burford Touts 73% Return on
Arbitration Case, THE LITIG. DAILY (June 3, 2014), http://www.litigationdaily.com/id=12026
57892304/Burford-Touts-73-Return-on-Arbitration-Case?slreturn=20141030170316.
30 For Law Firms, BURFORD CAPITAL, http://www.burfordcapital.com/how-we-help/for-
law-firms/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2014); Services for Law Firms, GERCHEN KELLER CAPITAL,
http://www.gerchenkeller.com/what-we-do/service-for-law-firms/ (last visited Dec. 31,
2014).
31 Gerchen Keller Capital describes its defense products at Solutions for Defendants,
GERCHEN KELLER CAPITAL, http://www.gerchenkeller.com/what-we-do/defense-side-solu
tions/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2014).
32 See Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 62–63 (2011).
33 See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 262 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “champerty” as “[a]n
agreement between an officious intermeddler in a lawsuit and a litigant by which the inter-
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tion designed to avoid such intermeddling and to ensure that only authentic
claims are brought to the courts is the doctrine of champerty, which bars
profiting from financing lawsuits and related (though functionally different)
prohibitions against claim assignment.34  Champerty and assignment limits
can apply regardless of claim type, serving to prohibit both commercial and
consumer claims.35
Underlying this broad bar are concerns about claim ownership, which is
reflected in a focus on whether the funder has received control of the litiga-
tion.36  Much of legal ethics can be explained as creating safeguards that
ensure that the client, not the lawyer (especially pertinent in the case of con-
tingency lawyering), ultimately controls the claim.  For example, the Model
Rules of Professional Responsibility specifically carve out permission for
attorneys to make day-to-day decisions;37 this carve-out is necessary as a devia-
tion from the rule that the client ultimately controls her case.  In contrast,
only the client can make key decisions, with the most privileged decision
being the decision to settle, including the option to abandon the litigation.38
Because litigation funding has generally been discussed as an extension of
the contingency fee—the best known and the most important of the excep-
meddler helps pursue the litigant’s claim as consideration for receiving part of any judg-
ment proceeds”).
34 See N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 489 (2014) (prohibiting buying claims).
35 Each state’s doctrine varies, and certain exceptions can be made.  For example, New
York allows the free assignment of claims that are sufficiently large or of certain types. See
Anthony Sebok, Incorporating the Claim, A MODEL LITIG. FIN. CONTRACT (Feb. 4, 2013),
http://litigationfinancecontract.com/incorporating-the-claim/ (describing the indirect
way the New York statute defines permissible assignments).
36 A Texas appellate court listed factors potentially creating a problematic transfer of
control: “[P]ermitting appellees to select counsel, direct trial strategy, or participate in
settlement discussions, [or] . . . to look to . . . trial counsel directly for payment.”  Anglo-
Dutch Petrol. Int’l v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 104 (Tex. App. 2006).  A Florida appeals
court concluded a funder had so much control of the litigation that it was the real party in
interest.  Abu-Ghazaleh v. Chaul, 36 So. 3d 691, 693–94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); see also
Campbells Cash & Carry Pty. Ltd. v Fostif Pty. Ltd. (2006) 229 CLR 386 (Austl.) (landmark
Australian case in which the Australian High Court permitted the funder to have broad
control); Arkin v. Borchard Lines Ltd., [2005] EWCA (Civ) 655 (Eng.) (equally ground-
breaking English Court of Appeals decision, in which it established that third-party fund-
ing is acceptable, even desirable, to increase access to justice, but fell short of sanctioning
the transfer of control to funders); N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, FORMAL OPINION 2011-02: THIRD
PARTY LITIGATION FINANCING (2011), available at http://www.nycbar.org/index.php/eth-
ics/ethics-opinions-local/2011-opinions/1159-formal-opinion-2011-02 [hereinafter N.Y.C.
BAR OPINION] (noting that “a client may agree to permit a financing company to direct the
strategy or other aspects of a lawsuit,” including whether and for how much to settle, which
similarly acknowledges the potential value of funder involvement but leaves it to private
contracting rather than trying to interpret the law as allocating any control to the funder).
37 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (2007) (authorizing the attorney in part
to “take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the
representation”).
38 Id. (saying in part that “[a] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle
a matter”).
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tions to champerty—there is a natural tendency to assume that funders
should similarly have no control over the litigation generally and over settle-
ment specifically (though influence is permissible).39
A related concern is conflicts of interest, as the introduction of a finan-
cier into the attorney-client relationship can produce conflicts or reinforce
existing ones.40  In addition to conflicts that are similar to those that exist
between contingency fee lawyers and their clients—such as incentives to set-
tle early in order to maximize profits across a portfolio rather than in a par-
ticular case, incentives to prioritize reputation over monetary relief, and
incentives to prioritize monetary relief over nonmonetary relief41—interest-
ing examples of conflicts unique to the funder-client relationship include
those that may arise if a funder decides to securitize its pool of litigations42 or
to invest on both sides of the “v.”  Conflict concerns are often also concerns
about control.  Instead of overt control, like formal settlement authority or
the right to dictate choice of counsel, conflicts can generate hidden forms of
control.  For example, any repeat-play relationship between funder and the
litigation counsel gives funder informal but significant influence over the
conduct of the case.
39 ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, WHITE PAPER ON ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANC-
ING 26 (2011) (drft.), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/admin-
istrative/ethics_2020/20111019_draft_alf_white_paper_posting.authcheckdam.pdf
[hereinafter ABA WHITE PAPER] (noting that lawyers should not allow alternative litigation
funders to influence their professional judgment when it comes to litigation strategy); see
N.Y.C. BAR OPINION, supra note 36 (noting that the company may not influence the judg-
ment of a lawyer when it comes to litigation strategy but may have a say in settlement
offers). But cf. Steinitz, supra note 9, at 509 (arguing that sophisticated plaintiffs in com-
mercial cases should be allowed to sell control in exchange for a control premium).
40 See Steinitz, supra note 9, at 481–82 (noting the conflicts of interest that arise in the
triangular attorney-client-funder relationship); Steinitz, supra note 8, at 1291–92, 1323–25
(noting that “conflicts between an attorney’s interest to maximize fees and those of the
financier to do the same” may arise).  Specifically, see N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
r. 1.2(d), 1.6(a), 1.7(a), 1.8(e), 1.8(f), 2.1, 2.2, 5.4(c) (2009) (various rules governing
attorney-client relations, including rules about attorneys’ compensation). See generally
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0(e) (informed consent); id. r. 1.6–1.11 (confidenti-
ality of information; conflict of interest: current clients, specific rules; duties to former
clients; imputation of conflicts of interest: general rules, special conflicts of interest for
former and current government officers and employees); id. r. 2.1 (counsel as “advisor”);
id. r. 2.3 (counsel’s evaluation of a matter for use by a third party).  These are the rules
addressed in the New York City Bar’s formal 2011 opinion on the ethics of third party
litigation finance.  See N.Y.C. BAR OPINION, supra note 36.  The American Bar Association
has issued a draft opinion on the ethics of third party litigation financing, discussing the
practice in light of the model rules. See ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 39.
41 HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS 9–16 (2004) (applying
modern portfolio theory to contingency fee practice and, among other things, analyzing
the conflicts that a portfolio of contingency fee cases creates); Steinitz, supra note 8, at
1312–18 (analyzing the effects of portfolio management on litigation finance).
42 For an analysis of the conflicts that may arise if funders ever securitize litigation, see
Steinitz, supra note 8, at 1312.
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As is already implied, litigation funding both affects and is affected by
attorneys’ ethics.  Therefore, attorneys’ professional responsibility duties
function as indirect regulation of litigation funding.  Like authentic claim
issues, one such duty is a broad bar: the prohibition on fee-splitting (that is,
splitting the fee between a lawyer and a nonlawyer).43  This prohibition pre-
vents business models that make economic sense,44 and it distorts contractual
relationships among lawyers, plaintiffs, and funders.  The same is true of the
prohibitions on the unauthorized practice of law45 and on multidisciplinary
practices (i.e., the practice of law and other professions, such as accounting,
in a single firm).46  Each of these in isolation and in combination means, for
example, that finance or accounting specialists cannot partner up with law-
yers in a single firm that engages in the practice of law.  (However, litigation
finance firms are firms in which former attorneys partner up with such
finance specialists.  They must therefore be careful not to overstep the
bounds and engage in the practice of law.)47
Another set of ethical regulations again relates to control: an attorneys’
ethical duties to exercise independent judgment,48 free from funder influ-
ence, and to zealously and loyally represent their clients even if it means
being in conflict with the funder.49  These obligations, combined with the
fee-splitting prohibition, for example, limit a direct engagement between the
funder and the attorney for the financing of litigation and require the funder
to contract directly with the client.  Finally, attorneys’ ethical duties also limit
or prohibit specific financial arrangements between the attorney and funder
such as paying referral fees.50
In addition to industry-wide challenges such as champerty and attorney
ethical duties, other doctrines challenge the terms of individual deals or deal
43 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(a).
44 Victoria Shannon, The Funder as Co-Counsel: A Glimpse into the Future of Law Firm
Ownership, A MODEL LITIG. FIN. CONTRACT (Mar. 11, 2013), http://litigationfinancecon-
tract.com/the-funder-as-co-counsel-a-glimpse-into-the-future-of-law-firm-ownership/.
45 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.5.
46 See Shannon, supra note 44 (noting that only attorneys can own law firms).
47 The line can be blurred the more financiers seek to be active funders who monitor
and actively seek to enhance the value of their investment. Compare Maya Steinitz, Funders
as Lawyers, A MODEL LITIG. FIN. CONTRACT (Mar. 13, 2013), http://litigationfinancecon-
tract.com/funders-as-lawyers/, with Edward A. Reilly Jr., Funders as Lawyers: A Response, A
MODEL LITIG. FIN. CONTRACT (Mar. 18, 2013), http://litigationfinancecontract.com/
funders-as-lawyers-a-response/, and Maya Steinitz, Funders As Fiduciaries, A MODEL LITIG.
FIN. CONTRACT (Mar. 20, 2013), http://litigationfinancecontract.com/funders-as-fiducia-
ries/ (presenting a back-and-forth discussion between scholars on the role of lawyers as
funders).
48 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4.
49 Id. r. 1.3 cmt. 1.
50 See Maya Steinitz & Abigail C. Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, 99 IOWA L.
REV. 711, 736–37 (2014) (discussing referrals and repeat play between funders and
attorneys).
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types, namely the doctrines of usury,51 unconscionability,52 and abuse of pro-
cess.53  All but the last of these doctrines focus on potentially exploitative
financing terms, and as a general matter are raised by consumers rather than
plaintiffs involved in the large commercial deals conducted pursuant to
bespoke contracts.  Nonetheless, when a commercial plaintiff seeks to invali-
date a deal because it does not like the financing terms in hindsight—after
the claim has been resolved—such arguments have come up.54
A final set of concerns arising from litigation finance include the pres-
sure to commodify claims by resolving them all with money, as opposed to
resolution via injunctive or other nonmonetary relief.55  Again, underlying
the tension is the issue of claim control or influence; if the funder has none
there is no pressure to commodify the claim.  Claim commodification reflects
perhaps the purest tension between the justice and economic/finance mod-
els of litigation and is the reason why financing of certain categories of
claims, e.g., torts or claims arising under public international law, should pro-
ceed with great caution and may require different regulation than financing
of commercial claims.
* * *
In sum, path dependency—a path focused on avoiding champerty and
influenced by the philosophy that there is something vaguely distasteful56
about litigation funding—has obscured a simple fact.  The fact is that some
plaintiffs have come to regard their claims as assets they wish to monetize—
51 See Martin, Litigation Financing, supra note 18, at 86–87 (noting that the prohibition
on usury “has an ancient history” and presents a pitfall for litigation financing firms).
52 Julia H. McLaughlin, Litigation Funding: Charting a Legal and Ethical Course, 31 VT. L.
REV. 615, 643 (2007) (“The contract defense of unconscionability provides another basis
upon which to challenge the validity of [litigation loan] agreements.”).
53 See LISA BENCH NIEUWVELD & VICTORIA SHANNON, THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN INTERNA-
TIONAL ARBITRATION 41 (2012) (discussing the abuse of process doctrine).
54 S & T Oil Equip. & Mach., Ltd. v. Juridica Invs. Ltd., No. H-11-0542, 2011 WL
864837 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2011), is an example of a financed large commercial claim in
which a remorseful buyer—the plaintiff—tried to invalidate the financing arrangement.
See Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Smith, 243 S.W.3d 776, 779 (Tex. App. 2007) (not-
ing the arguments made by the plaintiff that the funding was a usurious loan, or an unre-
gistered (and thus invalid) security, or void as against public policy); Anglo-Dutch
Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 95–105 (Tex. App. 2006) (analyzing usury,
unregistered securities, and public policy arguments).
55 See infra Part III.
56 See Michael Herman, Fear of Third Party Litigation Funding Is Groundless, TIMES
(London) (Oct. 25, 2007, 1:28 PM), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/law/article2210239
.ece (“Detractors [of third party litigation funding feel] . . . that there is something distaste-
ful, some say unethical, about a third-party that has no involvement in a legal dispute being
allowed to profit from it.”).  This is the notion underlying Sebok, supra note 32, at 62; see
also W. Bradley Wendel, Alternative Litigation Finance and Anti-Commodification Norms, 63
DEPAUL L. REV. 655, 657 (2014) (theorizing the “‘ick factor’ that is often cited in discus-
sions of [alternative litigation finance]”).
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i.e., sell in whole or in part.57  To the extent that they wish to sell parts of the
asset they are bringing in business partners.  Business partners are a known
beast: they are allowed to contract for control, they are allowed to participate
in the management of their investment and the underlying asset, and in cer-
tain circumstances they owe and are owed fiduciary duties (if structured as a
partnership) or at least a duty of good faith.58  They must avoid self-dealing,
are generally subject to the various laws and doctrines that address conflicts
of interest, and they can request to review books and records, and more.59
In other words, there is an entire area of law, as law students learn as
soon as they commence their legal education, that has evolved during mod-
ern times, since the advent of limited liability, to deal with these kinds of
commercial relationships: the law of business entities.  There is no good rea-
son to prevent parties to litigation funding arrangements from availing them-
selves of the mechanisms, laws, and practices that have evolved in the law of
corporations to deal with these very same problems.  Some concrete exam-
ples are provided in Part III.
But first, the next Part demonstrates that these issues of ownership and
control can be directly addressed when issuing securities tied to litigation
proceeds, either directly or through an SPV, or when using an SPV to
embody and distribute the value of the claim to the SPV’s owners, rather
than to litigation proceed-backed security holders.  Understanding how con-
trol and conflicts were addressed in these deals will lay the foundation for
bringing general principles of corporate law to bear.
II. CLAIM INCORPORATION AND LITIGATION GOVERNANCE: WINSTAR,
INFORMATION RESOURCES, CRYSTALLEX, AND TRECA60
Legal claims are notoriously difficult to value.61  Consequently, they are
very difficult to account for on a corporation’s books.62  And when a claim is
materially large relative to a plaintiff-company’s value as a going concern,
legal claims can, and have, become insurmountable obstacles to pricing a
57 As is recognized by the literature on claim assignment. See generally Michael
Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697 (2005); Sebok, supra note
32.
58 See Anthony J. Sebok & W. Bradley Wendel, Duty in the Litigation-Investment Agree-
ment: The Choice Between Tort and Contract Norms When the Deal Breaks Down, 66 VAND. L. REV.
1831, 1836 (2013) (describing the rights and duties that arise in contract law including a
duty of good faith).
59 See infra Part III.
60 I thank Abigail C. Field for her assistance with this section.  Her many insights have
been invaluable to its development.
61 See Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 380–85
(2009) (discussing the difficulties of pricing litigation risk); Maya Steinitz, How Much Is
That Lawsuit in the Window? Pricing Legal Claims, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1889, 1903–06 (2013).
62 A note on individual plaintiffs: individuals have an access to justice problem as well
as difficulties valuing legal claims and receiving accounting and tax benefits on causes of
action and pending litigation, as opposed to on damages they have received.  While these
are beyond the scope of this Article, I hope to see others investigate them.
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merger, acquisition, or major equity investment.  This hidden cost of litiga-
tion imposes major restrictions on a business simply because a large legal
claim exists.63  Importantly, when litigation causes difficulties in entering
into mergers or acquisitions, transacting into large equity infusion, or affects
the cost of capital, the hidden costs can dwarf the expense of pursuing a
claim.
Additionally, corporations, which are generally conservative about suing,
are experiencing value destruction in the form of unprosecuted claims.
These too should be included in any analysis of the hidden costs of litigation,
to the extent that claims are not prosecuted because of the difficulty in ascer-
taining value, the difficulty in ascertaining the likelihood of success prosecut-
ing meritorious claims, negative accounting treatment during claim conduct,
or unfavorable tax treatment.  Potential corporate plaintiffs face a decision to
dedicate significant sums to cover litigation fees and costs in return for an
outcome that is uncertain.64  The potential for a larger recovery is usually
accompanied by higher costs in pursuing the litigation.  And accompanying
the higher costs are larger downside risks and opportunity costs.  Often, the
company can employ the funds required to pursue litigation on other activi-
ties, such as operations or marketing, with less risk.
Even where valuation is straightforward, accounting treatment can be
unfavorable from the plaintiff-corporation’s perspective, deterring the corpo-
ration from bring meritorious claims.  For starters, all the costs of litigating
are accounted for as expenses, a negative impact that particularly hurts earn-
ings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) calcula-
tions.65  Next, accounting rules do not allow recognition of the potential
upside while the claim is pending.  The Financial Accounting Standards
63 Jonathan Molot introduced a similar idea in the defense context, dubbing it the
“tertiary cost” of litigation, and concluded the solution was a market in legal defenses:
[I]n some instances, litigation’s largest expense may stem from the “tertiary”
effects that pending litigation may have on litigant conduct.  A $50 million lawsuit
against a company can easily prevent that company from raising $250 million or
even $500 million in debt or equity to finance new, productive business activities.
At the very least, the uncertainty surrounding a significant potential liability may
increase a company’s cost of capital by depressing its stock price or increasing the
interest rate it must pay on its debt.  Where litigation risk interferes with an equity
investment, a debt refinancing, or a merger or acquisition the tertiary costs of
litigation can dwarf the primary costs.
Molot, supra note 61, at 374–75.  For empirical work on the effects of litigation on a com-
pany’s stock price, see David M. Cutler & Lawrence H. Summers, The Costs of Conflict Resolu-
tion and Financial Distress: Evidence from the Texaco-Pennzoil Litigation, 19 RAND J. ECON. 157,
169 (1988) (estimating that the Texaco-Pennzoil litigation had reduced the combined
equity value of the two companies by about $2 billion and that further losses may have
been incurred by Texaco’s bondholders).
64 See id.
65 See #7 Financial Acumen—Taking Litigation Off the Corporate Balance Sheet, BURFORD
CAPITAL, http://www.burfordcapital.com/casestudies/financial-acumen-taking-litigation-
off-the-corporate-balance-sheet/#sthash.ppJmSBlw.dpuf (last visited Dec. 31, 2014) (not-
ing that the accounting result of pursuing a successful claim can perversely be a permanent
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Board (FASB) prohibits evaluating and listing a claim as an asset on a bal-
ance sheet.66  In addition, as paradigmatic examples of gain contingency,67
pending court cases and legal claims cannot be recognized in the income
statement of a company until all contingencies have been resolved.68  How-
ever, even when a claim is resolved favorably, the accounting is not helpful,
particularly for EBITDA-based businesses, as the income must be listed as a
nonrecurring item.69
The accounting difficulties are likely the reason why banks do not con-
sider legal cases to be assets and why they do not lend based on the value of
contingent fees, no matter how large the potential contingency:
Most business can turn to banks for help, but law firms are often stuck.
Banks don’t consider legal cases to be assets and won’t lend based on the
value of “contingent fees” since there’s no guarantee of getting them.  So the
only way to get a bank loan is for the partners to borrow money personally or
use their credit cards.70
In addition, banks do not invest in litigation financing because it is
financing provided upfront with no expected cash flow for an extended
period of time.71  Last but not least, funding litigation can pose business con-
flicts for banks.  This problem on the plaintiff side is analogous to the diffi-
culty that litigation poses to defendants’ ability to raise debt and equity.
reduction in EBITDA because legal fees paid reduce EBITDA but recoveries occur below
the EBITDA line).
66 See Selvyn Seidel & Sandra Sherman, Corporate Governance Issues Regarding “Stock Price
Manipulation” and “Insider Trading” (and Other Matters) Are Coming to Third Party Financing, A
MODEL LITIG. FIN. CONTRACT (Mar. 25, 2013), http://litigationfinancecontract.com/cor
porate-governance-issues-regarding-stock-price-manipulation-and-insider-trading-and-
other-matters-are-coming-to-third-party-financing/.
67 See FASB ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION TOPIC 450-30-20, CONTINGENCIES
(“An existing condition, situation, or set of circumstances involving uncertainty as to possi-
ble gain [is referred to as a ‘gain contingency’] to an enterprise that will ultimately be
resolved when one or more future events occur or fail to occur.”).
68 Disclosure of such gain contingencies can be made when the probability that it will
be realized are high but “care shall be exercised to avoid misleading implications as to the
likelihood of realization.” Id. 450-30-50-1.  Consequently, “gain [contingencies] usually
should not be reflected in the financial statements.” Id. 450-30-25-1.
69 See supra text accompanying note 65.
70 See Jonathan D. Epstein, An Unusual Financial Niche: Lending Money to Lawyers Small
Law Firms Turn to an Amherst Company When They Need Money to Finance Big Cases, BUFFALO
NEWS (Sept. 30, 2007, 12:01 AM), http://www.buffalonews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID
=/20070930/BUSINESS/309309945; see also Ben Winograd, Specialized Lenders Help Fill
Financing Void for Law Firms, AM. BANKER, Nov. 2, 2006, at 3, available at 2006 WLNR
19416119 (“No matter how large the potential verdict, banks generally will not make loans
beyond the existing assets of a firm or its attorneys.”).  While relying on personal loans is
costly and risky for partners, the partners also suffer because the interest on personal loans
is not tax deductible as a business expense.  “Also, until the case is finished, attorneys can’t
deduct the enormous legal case expenses that are incurred.”  Epstein, supra; see also
Winograd, supra, at 3 (“Even if they ultimately win the case, it can take years before the
lawyers recoup their costs.”).
71 I thank Victor Goldberg for this comment.
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The reconceptualization of legal claims as assets that the American legal
world is currently undergoing, combined with (i) the newfound purchasing
power of corporations and their consequent ability to lower their legal
costs;72 and (ii) a solution to the problem of the hidden costs, may all com-
bine to form a new reality in which corporate and sovereign plaintiffs are
able to monetize the value of all their meritorious legal claims, rather than
forgo some of them.
While hard-to-value litigation actually threatening a merger or acquisi-
tion is an unusual situation, it arose several times in the 1990s, and some
innovative lawyers correctly concluded that incorporating and trading in
legal claims through the use of securities73 would help their clients overcome
the hidden costs.  These are most of the deals described below.
There is some evidence that these deals are not sui generis.  For exam-
ple, preceding the Winstar deals described below were deals by banks that
“had established trusts for shareholders, assigning them contingent rights in
litigation.”74  All of these legal innovations operate in a similar legal gray
zone as the financial innovation that is litigation finance, for the same under-
72 See Jonathan D. Glater, Billable Hours Giving Ground at Law Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
2009, at A1, available at 2009 WLNR 1784153 (“Clients are more concerned about the
budgets, more so than perhaps a year or two ago.” (quoting Evan R. Chesler, presiding
partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP)).
73 On issuing securities as a mechanism for litigation funding for reasons other than
those discussed here, see generally Steinitz & Field, supra note 50, at 711.  There, a co-
author and I suggested issuing “Litigation Proceed Rights,” a kind of privately placed, heav-
ily restricted security, in order to implement the idea that litigation finance can be
modeled on venture capital. Id. at 728.  In the venture capitalist context, startup compa-
nies issue securities that compensate the venture capitalists for their investment.  We sug-
gest, similarly, that securities can be used to effectuate staged funding which allows for
minimizing the extreme uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs that charac-
terize litigation as an investment. Id. at 745–49.  While we do not use the incorporation
paradigm to describe the security, the deal we propose constitutes a “loose incorporation”
of the claim.  Professor Richard Painter has also commented on some of the securities laws
implications of using such securities. See Richard Painter, The Model Contract and the Securi-
ties Laws, Part I, MODEL LITIG. FIN. CONTRACT (July 15, 2013), http://litigationfinancecon-
tract.com/the-model-contract-and-the-securities-laws-part-1/.
74 See Margaret Cronin Fisk, ‘Winstar’ Litigants Bet on Future Damages Awards, NAT’L L.J.,
Jan. 11, 1999, at A19 (“[T]his was rare, and you couldn’t buy or sell these rights.” (quoting
Victor Lewkow, partner, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP)).  Another early financial
instrument tied to litigation proceeds were the tobacco settlement bonds.  These bonds
also implicated the issues of control and conflicts of interests. See, e.g., Jody Sindelar &
Tracy Falba, Securitization of Tobacco Settlement Payments to Reduce States’ Conflict of Interest, 23
HEALTH AFF. 188, 188 (2004) (“[T]he issue [raised by securitization] is lack of commit-
ment to tobacco control by states.  Further, securitization can mitigate states’ conflict of
interest between keeping tobacco companies fiscally healthy to ensure their [Master Settle-
ment Agreement] payments and reducing tobacco sales for health reasons.  States should
not align with tobacco companies with the common interest of keeping tobacco companies
fiscally healthy.”).
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lying reasons.  Consequently, these efficient and commonsensical market
solutions seem to be very rarely used.75
This Section describes litigation proceed-backed securities tied to six
claims, and then a litigation finance deal that involved regular corporate
securities as part of a secured lending litigation finance deal for a bankrupt
plaintiff.  I classify the claim incorporation as “loose” or “strict” depending on
whether the plaintiff issues a security directly (loose) or the claim/right to
receive all proceeds of the claim is transferred to an SPV while the litigation
is pending, or whether the SPV issues a litigation-backed security (strict).
Each incorporation, whether loose or strict, is always coupled with a formal
allocation of control and ownership of the claim, as well as a preemptive
resolution of conflicts or a voting process by which such conflicts are
resolved.
Specifically, below are (1) examples of both strict and loose incorpora-
tion arising from litigation against the federal government filed in the mid-
and late-1990s by failed or nearly failed savings and loans, collectively known
as the Winstar cases, after the case name in the U.S. Supreme Court decision
determining the government’s liability.76  The merger-pricing problem arose
in a non-Winstar context too.  For example, Information Resources needed
to spin off its antitrust claim in order to complete a deal in which it was to be
acquired and taken private.  (2) The Crystallex deal provides a second exam-
ple, which involves that bankrupt company’s massive arbitration claim against
Venezuela.  (3) A third example is of a trust contemplated in connection
with the funding of transnational mass tort litigation, known as the Chevron-
Ecuador litigation.  The trust incorporation contemplated in this funding
arrangement would have been a strict incorporation.
A. Loose and Strict Incorporation to Reduce Hidden Costs: The Winstar Savings
& Loans Litigations and Information Resources
In the 1980s, following the savings and loan (S&L) crisis, the federal
government facilitated mergers between failing institutions and relatively
healthier ones.  A crucial deal point was regulators’ blessing that “goodwill”
75 The author was only able to identify the Treca, Winstar, Information Resources, and
Crystallex examples.  A special thanks to Abigail C. Field for bringing to my attention the
Information Resources deal.  In researching these deals, I have found no instances in
which such transactions ended up being challenged through litigation on issues such as
champerty.  Two deals were involved in litigation, both while the plaintiff company was in
bankruptcy.  The creditor status attached to being a Dime warrants holder was litigated in
Washington Mutual’s bankruptcy, as discussed below, and in the debtor-in-possession
financing deal for Crystallex, which was a litigation funding deal, which was challenged by
dissident Crystallex bondholders who wanted the bankruptcy judge to accept their debtor-
in-possession financing deal instead.  Neither litigation sought to void the transactions on
the basis of litigation finance concerns.
76 See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996) (holding that the U.S. gov-
ernment had breached its contractual obligations when Congress substantially changed
certain tax incentives for financial institutions that agreed to take over failing thrifts).
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associated with the transactions could be counted as part of the merged
S&L’s required capital and written off over decades.  In 1989, Congress
enacted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
(FIRREA)77 that attempted to both prevent future S&L failures and facilitate
accountability for the crisis that had happened.  One part of FIRREA focused
on making S&Ls sounder by forcing them to be better capitalized.78  One
capitalization-related change imposed by FIRREA was that the S&Ls were
forced to write down the “supervisory goodwill” much faster, with an immedi-
ate and major impact on the balance sheets of the merged companies.  Many
such companies sued the federal government on both breach of contract and
constitutional bases.
In its July 1996 decision upholding the government’s liability on the
breach of contract claims,79 the U.S. Supreme Court gave this recitation of
the history:
The impact of FIRREA’s new capital requirements upon institutions
that had acquired failed thrifts in exchange for supervisory goodwill was swift
and severe. . . . Despite the statute’s limited exception intended to moderate
transitional pains, many institutions immediately fell out of compliance with
regulatory capital requirements, making them subject to seizure by thrift
regulators.80
Three S&Ls were involved in that case, and the claim of one of them,
Glendale Federal Bank, became the focus of one of the litigation securities
discussed herein.  As the Court noted:
Respondents Glendale Federal Bank, FSB, Winstar Corporation, and The
Statesman Group, Inc., acquired failed thrifts in 1981, 1984, and 1988,
respectively.  After the passage of FIRREA, federal regulators seized and liq-
uidated the Winstar and Statesman thrifts for failure to meet the new capital
requirements.  Although the Glendale thrift also fell out of regulatory capi-
tal compliance as a result of the new rules, it managed to avoid seizure
through a massive private recapitalization.81
77 Pub. L. No. 103-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
78 See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 857 (discussing the requirements of FIRREA in regards to
capital structure).
79 Glendale filed its suit in 1990 and won its partial summary judgment motion on the
contract claims in 1992. See Glendale Federal Awarded Damages in Supervisory Goodwill Suit vs.
U.S. Government, BUS. WIRE, Apr. 9, 1999, available at LEXIS, News and Business, Individual
Publications, Business Wire.  The government won its appeal to the Federal Circuit, but
Glendale won the en banc rehearing in August 1995.  Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64
F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 518 U.S. 839 (1996).
80 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 857–58.
81 Id. at 858.  With regard to Glendale, it agreed to take over a failed Florida thrift in
1981 and regulators allowed it to offset bad loans with “supervisory goodwill” that it would
then write off over the next forty years.  When FIRREA passed, Glendale Federal still had
$565 million in supervisory goodwill remaining.  To compensate for the FIRREA require-
ments, Glendale said it was forced to decrease its assets by more than $10 billion. See
Deborah Adamson, Glenfed Parent Announces Earnings Up, Trading Plan, DAILY NEWS, Oct.
29, 1997, available at 1997 WLNR 1581419.
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Importantly, while Winstar established the idea that the government
could be liable—and was liable to Glendale, whose parent Golden State
Bancorp eventually issued securities tied to that litigation—the various S&L
deals involved different language and facts, and thus liability could not be
assumed in all S&L cases.  Thus, when California Federal Bank (Cal Fed),
Dime, and Coast Federal issued litigation proceeds-based securities, as dis-
cussed below,82 liability in those cases had not been determined.  Only
Golden State’s security issuance was founded on established liability.83  In
fact, when Cal Fed issued its securities, the Winstar Supreme Court decision
quoted above had not yet been issued.  These deals thus highlight that the
tremendous risk inherent in litigation, particularly early stage litigation, is
not itself a bar to issuing securities, even ones that trade on public markets.
Because Cal Fed was the first issuer, I begin with its deal.
1. Loose Incorporation in the Cal Fed Litigation: Participation Right
Certificates
The Cal Fed case arose from its acquisition of four thrifts in 1982 and
1983.84  Cal Fed filed suit in 1992, but its case was stayed while the Winstar
cases were litigated.  In July 1995, prior to the Supreme Court decision in
Winstar, Cal Fed issued the first of two securities (called Participation Right
Certificates) related to its supervisory goodwill claim.85  These Participation
Right Certificates entitled holders to a share of approximately 25% of the net
proceeds if ever realized,86 and were issued directly by Cal Fed, with Cal Fed
retaining control of the claim.  Thus, the Participation Right Certificates
represent a partial, and “loose,” incorporation of Cal Fed’s claim.
The first Cal Fed issuance was not done to solve a hidden cost problem;
some speculated it was done purely to line the pockets of the executives and
directors at the expense of shareholders.87  Nonetheless, the market price of
82 See infra subsections II.A.1–4.
83 See Coast Fed. Litig. Contingent Payment Rights Trust, Registration Statement
(Form S-4), at 17 (Jan. 13, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1052801/0000950150-98-000043.txt [hereinafter Coast Fed. Litig., Contingent Payment
Rights Trust (Form S-4)].
84 U.S. Court of Appeals Rules Golden State Bancorp May Seek Damages for Lost Profits in Cal
Fed Supervisory Goodwill Case, BUS. WIRE, Apr. 3, 2001, available at LEXIS, News and Business,
Individual Publications, Business Wire.
85 California Federal Bank Goodwill Participation Securities Declared Effective; Record Date Set,
PR NEWSWIRE, June 28, 1995, available at LEXIS, News and Business, Individual Publica-
tions, PR Newswire.
86 Id.
87 Kurt Eichenwald, No Toasters at This Bank.  It’s Giving Away a Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 1995, at F6; see also id. (“[If] markets work the way they should, for every penny
the shareholders receive in this new security, they should lose a like amount in their Cal
Fed shares. . . . Some Cal Fed executives say they don’t buy that.  Instead, they assert that,
by shedding 25 percent of a potential asset, the share price of the company could actually
go up.  The way the logic goes, creating the new security could force the market to come to
grips with the possible value of a lawsuit once kissed off as negligible.”).
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that first security was used to value the claim when Cal Fed entered a merger
agreement with First Nationwide Holdings, and the second litigation security
was issued as part of the terms of that merger to resolve the hidden cost
problem.88  That second security was similar to the first, in that holders were
entitled to a fraction of any net cash recovery after other claims, such as those
of the first security’s holders, had been paid.  Because both securities were
redeemable for cash, they had negative tax consequences for the sharehold-
ers who initially received them.89  Both securities traded on the NASDAQ.
From both a champerty and privilege waiver perspective, it is nigh
impossible to see an issue created by Cal Fed’s approach.  From the cham-
perty perspective, shareholders were only given something they were always
entitled to—the right to receive the value of the claim.  True, by trading the
certificates to people who were not shareholders of Cal Fed, investors who
were “strangers” to the litigation stood to profit if the litigation was success-
ful.  Nonetheless, they had not actually financed the litigation; Cal Fed did
not receive payment in those transactions.  Finally, no claim transfer
occurred; the plaintiff retained full control of its litigation.  From a privilege
perspective, the company simply did not reveal any privileged information to
shareholders or certificate holders, and no funder or other party was inserted
into the attorney-client relationship.90
The Cal Fed-First Nationwide merger closed in January 1997.  Later that
year Cal Fed began merger talks with Golden State, setting in motion that
S&L’s spinoff of its Winstar litigation, discussed below.91  Cal Fed was the
surviving company in that transaction, which closed in 1998.  That year Cal
Fed’s litigation securities were trading as high as $16 to $17.92  In April 1999
88 For the valuation of the suit using the first security’s trading value, see First Nation-
wide Holdings Inc., Amended and Restated Agreement and Plan of Merger (Form 8-K),
ex. 2.1 (Jan. 16, 1997), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/928358/
0000950136-97-000047.txt (showing the unaudited pro forma financial data reflecting the
financial condition of the proposed merged company).  For a discussion of the secondary
security issued as part of the merger, see Article I of the Merger Agreement. Id. at A-1.
89 See Nantahala Capital Partners v. Wash. Mut., Inc. (In re Wash. Mut., Inc.), 464 B.R.
656, 661 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (discussing the development of litigation tracking warrants
to avoid the taxation issue posed by certificates that could be redeemed for cash); see also
Ferve Ozturk, Nantahala: Litigation Tracking Warrants Are Debt, Not Equity, AM. BANKR. INST.
J., May 2012, at 22–23, 70–71 (same).
90 Disclosure is one of the interesting challenges regarding claim-based securities.
While these deals suggest the securities laws’ command to disclose material information
can be met without disclosing privileged information, it is possible to imagine a claim that
involves privileged information that investors would find material if they knew it to exist.
On the possible operation of securities regulation, see generally Wendy Gerwick Couture,
Securities Regulation of Alternative Litigation Finance, 42 SEC. REG. L.J. 5, 14 (2014).
91 See infra subsection II.A.2.
92 Paul Sweeney, How to Win Big in Court and Never See a Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1,
1998, at BU 10 (noting that at the time of the article, the first issuance traded at $16.125
and the second one traded at $17.75).
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the court awarded Cal Fed a mere $23 million, and the certificates plum-
meted in value.93
In 2002, Citigroup acquired Cal Fed, and thus it absorbed both Cal Fed’s
goodwill claim and Golden State’s, and their related securities obligations.94
In October 2005 the $23 million Cal Fed judgment became final when the
U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.  As a result, Citigroup notified the Cal
Fed certificate holders they would get nothing.95
2. Loose Incorporation by Golden State: Litigation Tracking Warrants
In 1997 Glendale Federal’s parent, Golden State Bancorp, announced
its intention to merge with Cal Fed Bancorp.  In October 1997, while negotia-
tions were ongoing, Golden State declared that it would issue Litigation
Tracking Warrants (warrants, LTWs, or Golden LTWs) tied to the Glendale
claim.  The Golden LTWs were a “loose incorporation” of the Glendale claim
because they were issued by Golden State instead of a SPV.  Control of the
litigation remained with Golden State.  If the Glendale claim ever resulted in
proceeds, the warrants allowed holders to purchase shares of Golden State
common stock with an aggregate value pegged to the value of the proceeds
received.  The spinoff of the Glendale claim was done this way instead of via
Cal Fed-like certificates that could be redeemed for cash to avoid the income
tax consequences of the Cal Fed approach.96
The warrants were issued to solve the hidden cost problem.  Golden
State asserted the claim’s value was $1.5 billion, a number that would be
material in many deals even today.97  The chairman of Cal Fed explained
that the “two sides had been unable to agree on how much Glendale is really
worth once the anticipated damages on its goodwill suit against the federal
government are factored out of its stock price.”98  The warrants gave the
companies a “market mechanism” to resolve the dispute, namely a “collar.”99
Specifically, if “Glendale’s stock is worth $32 or less in a specified period after
93 Richard B. Schmitt, Investors Betting on Judgment for Thrift Take a Hit in California
Federal Ruling, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1999, at B11, available at LEXIS, News and Business,
Individual Publications, Wall Street Journal.
94 Laura Mandaro, In Brief: Citi Closes Purchase of California Federal, AM. BANKER, Nov.
15, 2002, available at 2002 WLNR 3143216.
95 Citibank (West), FSB, Announces Supreme Court Action in California Federal Bank v.
United States, BUS. WIRE, Oct. 4, 2005, available at LEXIS, News and Business, Individual
Publications, Business Wire.
96 See Nantahala Capital Partners v. Wash. Mut., Inc. (In re Wash. Mut., Inc.), 464 B.R.
656, 665 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (discussing the tax problem that LTWs solved); see also
Ozturk, supra note 89, at 22 (stating the tax difference between LPCs and LTWs).
97 In its pleadings, Glendale asserted damages of $1.5 billion, and indeed publicized
its offer to settle for that amount a month after announcing its intention to issue the war-
rants.  Brad Finkelstein & Brian Collins, Glendale Offers to Settle Its Goodwill Lawsuit, NAT’L
MORTG. NEWS, Dec. 1, 1997, at 17.
98 Snigdha Prakash, Despite Deal’s Complexities, CalFed Really Is the Buyer, AM. BANKER
(Feb. 12, 1998), www.americanbanker.com/issues/163_30/-94413-1.html.
99 Id.
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the goodwill litigation tracking warrants have been issued, its shareholders
get 55% of the combined company.  At $33 or more, they get 58% of the
company.”100  Market analysts reacted favorably:
[According to analysts], the warrants make it easier for the thrift to be taken
over since it separates the company’s legal claims against the government
from the company’s core business.
“It certainly removes a major stumbling block” in the event of an acqui-
sition . . . . “Now we can value it on its earnings and franchise.”101
The LTWs were issued in May 1998 to holders of Golden State common
stock on a “one share, one LTW basis.”102  If a “triggering event” occurred,
meaning, if sufficient litigation proceeds were received, warrant holders were
entitled to purchase Golden State common stock for $1 per share up to an
aggregate value of 85% of the net proceeds.  The remaining 15% was to be
retained by Golden State.  The warrants came without voting rights, liquida-
tion preferences, dividend or other distribution entitlements,103 and were
freely tradable, being registered on the NASDAQ.104  If Golden State under-
went future mergers, the LTWs would be exercisable against the surviving
company’s common stock on the same terms.105
How many shares could be purchased upon a triggering event could
only be determined at the time such an event occurred as there were two
unknowns—first, the amount of net proceeds received, and second, the mar-
ket price of Golden State stock.106
The prospectus made clear that Golden State owned and controlled the
litigation:
[Golden State] will retain sole and exclusive control of the Litigation
and will retain 100% of the proceeds of any recovery from the Litigation.
The Litigation will remain an asset of [Golden State] and [Golden State]
intends to pursue the Litigation with the same vigor as it has in the past.
100 Id.
101 Adamson, supra note 81, at 2 (quoting Charlotte Chamberlain, Vice President, Jef-
feries & Co.).
102 Golden State Bancorp Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 5, 1998), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1019508/0000898430-98-001724.txt; see Golden
State Bancorp Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), ex. 99B (Apr. 23, 1998), available at http:/
/www.secinfo.com/drdbh.71wj.c.htm#1stPage.  Golden State’s LTWs were also held in
reserve to be distributed to those who had the right to Golden State common stock via
convertible securities but had not yet exercised that right as of the record date.  No other
LTWs were to be issued. See Golden State Bancorp Inc., Warrant Agreement (Form 8-A),
ex. 3, § 2.1 (Apr. 22, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/10195
08/0000898430-98-001506.txt [hereinafter Golden State Bancorp Inc., Warrant Agreement
(Form 8-A)].
103 Golden State Bancorp Inc., Warrant Agreement (Form 8-A), supra note 102, at 9.
104 Id. at 4.
105 Id.
106 The formula is described in Golden State Bancorp Inc., Amendment No. 1 to Form
S-3 Registration Statement (Form S-3/A), at 8 (Apr. 22, 1998), available at http://www.sec
.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1019508/0000898430-98-001504.txt.
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[Golden State] reserves the right, however, to terminate the Litigation in
any manner it deems appropriate to serve [Golden State’s] best interest.107
Golden State was similarly clear that the resulting conflict between it and
the LTW holders was resolved in its favor:
The LTW[TM] Holders will not have any rights against the Company or the
Bank for any decision regarding the conduct of the Litigation or disposition
of the Litigation for an amount less than the amount it has claimed in dam-
ages in the ongoing trial in the Claims Court, regardless of the effect on the
value of the LTW[TM]s.  Although the Bank currently intends to continue
prosecuting the Litigation and to seek a cash recovery in the amount
claimed, there can be no assurance that the Bank will not make a different
determination in the future.108
Perhaps to reassure LTW holders that the claim conduct would be man-
aged well, Golden State and Cal Fed entered a “litigation management agree-
ment” to govern the conduct of the two goodwill claims—Golden State’s
claim and Cal Fed’s claim.109  The litigation management agreement created
two committees, one for each of the Glendale (Golden State) and Cal Fed
cases, and vested in those committees the full power of the board of directors
of the merged company in each committee with regard to the respective liti-
gation.  The litigation management agreement further provided that two
Golden State executives, knowledgeable of the underlying facts, would be
employed by the company as “Litigation Managers” for both cases, reporting
to both committees.110  Subject only to the ultimate authority of the commit-
tees, the Litigation Managers could retain or fire counsel, hire agents, and
take all steps appropriate relating to both litigations and the associated litiga-
tion securities.111
Even though the Litigation Managers were to be employees of the
merged company (Executive Vice Presidents) reporting to committees of the
boards of directors, and even though the company owned the litigation and
stood to receive substantial financial benefit from a successful conclusion of
both cases (including expense reimbursement and 15% of the value of the
proceeds), the litigation management agreement imposed a duty to cooper-
ate on the merged company.112  The litigation management agreement fur-
ther provided that the company would not merge or otherwise effect a
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Golden State Bancorp Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 3 (Feb. 17, 1998), availa-
ble at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1019508/0000898822-98-000214.txt.
110 First Nationwide Holdings Inc., Litigation Management Agreement (Form 8-K), ex.
99.2, art. I, at 2 (Feb. 17, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
928358/0000950136-98-000311.txt [hereinafter First Nationwide Holdings Inc., Litigation
Management Agreement (Form 8-K)].  The Cal Fed committee had the power to reduce
the litigation managers’ control of that case, but the litigation managers would still be paid
as if they were managing that case.
111 Id. art. II, § 2.1, at 4.
112 Id. § 2.2, at 9–10.
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change of control unless the rights of both the Litigation Managers and the
LTW holders were unaffected.113
Just as with the Cal Fed security, this loose incorporation approach poses
no problems from either a champerty or privilege waiver perspective.
Indeed, with the LTWs the distance from champerty is even greater, as the
litigation proceeds are simply a reference number, like LIBOR, and do not
have a direct connection to the securities.  Golden State retains the claim and
100% of its proceeds.
Because the legal claim was now reified—incorporated in the sense of
having a legal identity separate from the plaintiff—the LTWs not only solved
the merger pricing problem but also forced a change in the accounting of a
second merger,114 had a role in the mechanics of a third merger,115 and
were part of the consideration of the redemption of some preferred securi-
ties,116 all of which occurred before the Cal Fed deal closed.  The merger
between Golden State and Cal Fed closed in September 1998.117  Ultimately,
Citigroup, as part of its November 2002 merger with Cal Fed, assumed the
litigation and the warrants tracking it.118  As a result, Golden LTWs became
exercisable for shares in Citi if a triggering event occurred, which it did in
2005.
On March 15, 2005, the government paid Citi $381,538,695 to satisfy
damage and costs judgments in the Golden State/Glendale litigation.119
Those proceeds, after netting, resulted in an adjusted litigation recovery of
$153,776,991.120  The impact of costs and taxes is clear: 85% of the gross
proceeds would have been $324,307,890.75, more than double the amount
the LTW holders were entitled to.  In the end, each LTW was exercisable for
a 0.02302 share of common stock of Citigroup and $0.6725 in cash, with the
result that Citi would distribute up to 1,944,415 shares of Citigroup common
stock and $56,802,378, depending on how many LTWs were redeemed.121
113 Id. § 3.1(a), at 11–13.
114 Golden State Bancorp Announces Change in Accounting for Acquisition of CENFED Finan-
cial Corp., BUS. WIRE, Jan. 27, 1998.
115 See Golden State Bancorp Plans Stock Buyback, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1998, http://articles
.latimes.com/1998/may/20/business/fi-51586.
116 Golden State Bancorp to Redeem Series A Preferred Stock, BUS. WIRE, Aug. 19, 1998, availa-
ble at LEXIS, News and Business, Individual Publications, Business Wire.
117 California Federal Bank and Glendale Federal Bank Complete Merger, BUS. WIRE, Sept. 11,
1998, available at LEXIS, News and Business, Individual Publications, Business Wire.
118 Laura Mandaro, In Brief: Citi Closes Purchase of California Federal, AM. BANKER (Nov.
15, 2002), http://bi.galegroup.com.proxy.library.nd.edu/essentials/article/GALE—A942
50671/0eb3c98459403ce11561881df8be8191?u=nd_ref.
119 Citigroup Inc., Prospectus Supplement (Form S-3/A) (Aug. 31, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/000104746905009106/a2154892z424
b3.htm [hereinafter Citigroup Inc., Prospectus Supplement, (Form S-3/A)].
120 Id.
121 Citigroup Announces That the 60-Day Exercise Period for Its Litigation Tracking Warrants
Commenced Today, BUS. WIRE (Apr. 5, 2005, 6:00 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/
home/20050405005343/en/Citigroup-Announces-60-Day-Exercise-Period-Litigation-Track
ing#.VFVaJ75X_ww.
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The total cash value of each LTW on the day the distribution was determined
was $1.7931,122 which compares favorably with the $1.38 to $1.75 trading
range of the LTWs in the first quarter of 2005.123  However, that amount was
well below the $6 and 11/16 valuation on the close of the first day of trading
after issuance.124  The initial, much higher valuation in 1998 and the very
close to accurate valuation in 2005 demonstrate the impact of information
challenges on litigation valuation.  Early in the litigation—but after an initial
liability determination—the market price wildly overstated the securities’
value.  But when sufficient information was revealed—by the quarter prior to
claim resolution—the litigation was more accurately valued through a market
mechanism.
3. Loose Incorporation in the Dime/Anchor Savings Litigation: Litigation
Tracking Warrants
Anchor Savings’ claim was based on eight acquisitions of failing S&Ls
from 1982 to 1985, four of which were facilitated by regulators.125  When
FIRREA was enacted in 1989, Anchor’s books still carried over $500 million
of related capital, including the goodwill.  As a result, Anchor claimed it
faced severe limitations on its activities and was forced to liquidate valuable
assets at fire-sale prices.126  In 1994, Anchor and Dime Savings Bank agreed
to merge.  In January of 1995 Anchor filed the suit against the government.
Shortly thereafter the merger closed, and, as a result of the merger, Dime
became entitled to the proceeds.127  Because filing the claim did not disrupt
the merger pricing previously negotiated by Anchor and Dime, Anchor had
no motivation to issue litigation securities at that point.  However, a later deal
did face the pricing problem.
In early 2000, North Fork Bank attempted a hostile takeover of Dime.
Dime found a white knight in Warburg Pincus.  As Dime and Warburg did
not agree on the value of the litigation, that major equity investment faced
the hidden cost issue.  As a result, Dime issued LTWs on December 29,
2000.128  Again, because these were issued directly by Dime they represent a
“loose” incorporation.  Dime retained control of the litigation.  The Anchor/
122 Citigroup Inc., Prospectus Supplement (Form S-3/A), supra note 119, at S-6.
123 Id. at S-3.
124 In Brief: Warrants Fall, DAILY NEWS (L.A.), May 6, 1998, at 1.
125 WASHINGTON MUTUAL: Goodwill Lawsuit over 4 Acquisitions Pending, LLOYD’S CORP.
LITIG. REP., Oct. 3, 2008.
126 WASHINGTON MUTUAL: Broadbill Asserts Claim over Breach of Contract, 14 TROUBLED
CO. REP., May 28, 2010.
127 Id.
128 See Randi Feigenbaum & Tami Luhby, Dime’s Move May Quash Rival’s Bid, NEWSDAY,
July 7, 2000, at A55; Dime Announces Distribution of Litigation Tracking Warrants, BUS. WIRE,
Dec. 18, 2000, available at LEXIS, News and Business, Individual Publications, Business
Wire; Dime Announces Major Investment by Warburg Pincus, PR NEWSWIRE (July 6, 2000),
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/
Dime+Announces+Major+Investment£y+Warburg+Pincus.-a063179730.
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Dime LTWs were conceptually similar to the Golden State LTWs and were
similarly worth stock representing 85% of the net recovery.  Also like the
Golden State LTWs, the Dime LTWs traded on the NASDAQ and, because of
the merger, were ultimately redeemable for shares in a different company
than Dime.
In 2001 Dime announced its intention to merge with Washington
Mutual (WaMu), and that deal closed in 2002.129  Not much happened until
2008, when the trial court awarded $356 million in damages.130  The deci-
sion was appealed.131  Later in 2008, regulators seized WaMu and sold most
of its assets to JPMorgan Chase.132  The hollowed-out parent company filed
for bankruptcy the next day.133  In 2010 the appeals court remanded for fur-
ther damage calculations, suggesting the damages should be $63 million
more.134
Shortly thereafter LTW holders began negotiating with the WaMu
estate.  One group decided to settle and received some cash, some stock in a
reorganized WaMu, and some “Run-off Notes.”135  Other LTW holders sued,
seeking a declaration of their rights and creditor status above equity holders.
In 2012, the court ruled the LTWs were equity, and the litigating LTW hold-
ers were assigned such status and their related claims subordinated.136  As a
result of that decision, $337 million in proceeds were released into the
estate.137
4. Strict Incorporation in the Coast Savings litigation: Trust Certificates
Coast Savings Financial took over the failed Central Savings and Loan
Association from regulators in 1987, in a deal that involved a $298 million
“capital credit” that was wiped out by FIRREA in 1989.138  Coast filed its
goodwill claim in July 1992.139  The litigation was stayed (while the Glen-
129 See Washington Mutual Completes Acquisition of Dime Bancorp, BUS. WIRE, Jan. 7, 2002,
available at LEXIS, News and Business, Individual Publications, Business Wire; Washington
Mutual to Extend National Banking Franchise with $5.2 Billion Merger with Dime Bancorp, BUS.
WIRE, June 25, 2001, available at LEXIS, News and Business, Individual Publications, Busi-
ness Wire.





135 L. John Bird, Decision in Washington Mutual, Inc. Holds That Litigation Tracking War-
rants Are Equity Instruments, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=3f6bcffd-8198-492c-9677-4ea62b7434e8.
136 Nantahala Capital Partners v. Washington Mut., Inc. (In re Wash. Mut., Inc.), 464
B.R. 656, 660–61 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012).
137 Steven Church, WaMu Wins Approval to Settle Dispute with Warrant Holders, BLOOM-
BERG (Feb. 1, 2012, 3:25 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-01/wamu-wins-
approval-to-settle-dispute-with-holders-of-litigation-warrants.html.
138 Coast Federal Litig., Contingent Payment Rights Trust, supra note 83.
139 Id. at 7.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-3\NDL305.txt unknown Seq: 31  2-MAR-15 14:21
2015] incorporating  legal  claims 1185
dale/Winstar litigation worked its way to the Supreme Court), and the case
was not scheduled to be tried until 1999 at the earliest.140  However, in 1997
Coast began negotiating merger terms with H. F. Ahmanson & Co.
Again, the litigation’s valuation difficulty created hidden costs.  As part
of the merger agreement executed in October 1997, Coast Savings
announced it would spin off the value of its claim immediately pre-merger.
Coast effectuated its claim spinoff via a “strict” incorporation approach: it
created a trust to receive the value of the claim, the trustees of which con-
trolled the litigation, and then the trust issued contingent payment right cer-
tificates to Coast’s pre-merger shareholders.
The basic structure of the deal was as follows.  A trust was formed with
certain powers, approximately $20 million (earmarked for litigation
expenses), and an asset called “the Commitment.”  Securities embodying the
right to receive part of the payments made pursuant to the Commitment
were issued to existing Coast Savings shareholders.  Coast Savings merged
into H. F. Ahmanson and Ahmanson, as successor to Coast Savings, owned
the claim and the right to receive the proceeds.  If proceeds were ever
received, Ahmanson would be required by the Commitment to give them to
the trust.  Monies received by the trust were to be paid to certificate holders,
net of certain costs.
More specifically, on January 8, 1998, the Coast Federal Litigation Con-
tingent Payment Rights Trust (CPR Trust) was created, with the powers and
limitations conferred upon it by an Amended and Restated Declaration of
Trust signed by Coast Savings (as sponsor), Bankers Trust Company (as trus-
tee),141 and the CPR Trust (through its four Litigation Trustees).  On Janu-
ary 13, 1998, the CPR Trust registered Contingent Payment Rights
Certificates (CPR Certificates) with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion.142  On February 13, 1998, moments before the merger closed, Ahman-
son entered a commitment agreement with the CPR Trust, contributed
approximately $20 million to the CPR Trust to fund the litigation, and the
CPR Trust issued the CPR Certificates to Coast shareholders.143
This transaction is the purest strict incorporation of a claim I have found
(although the Treca Trust (discussed below) would be equally pure if it were
140 Id. at 12 (explaining that other cases with similar claims were scheduled for trial
before Coast Federal’s case was likely to go to trial).
141 Because the CPR Trust is a Delaware Statutory Trust, Banker’s Trust wears two trus-
tee hats: “Institutional Trustee” and “Delaware Trustee.”  Banker’s Trust’s real power
comes from its Institutional Trustee status.  For simplicity I simply speak of “trustee.”
142 Coast Federal Litig., Contingent Payment Rights Trust, supra note 83 (registering
20,703,817 contingent payment right certificate securities).
143 See id. at 3; see also Coast Litigation Trust Announces Judge’s Entry of Order Regarding
Government Liability, PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 25, 1998), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/coast-litigation-trust-announces-judges-entry-of-order-regarding-government-liabil-
ity-77233167.html.  While innovative in being used for litigation, contingent payment
rights, as a financial instrument, are old; a U.S. Supreme Court case ruled on the correct
tax treatment for a contingent payment right in 1931. See David Hasen, Financial Options in
the Real World: An Economic and Tax Analysis, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 789, 797 (2010).
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ever created).  This is because the Litigation Trustees were given complete
control over the claim; Ahmanson, which nominally owned the claim and
showed it on its books, had none.144  Moreover, the trustees’ primary loyalty
was to the CPR Trust, that is, to certificate holders, even at the expense of
Ahmanson, the claim owner.145  Thus in every sense except the most formal,
the CPR Trust embodied the claim.
While it is true that the Litigation Trustees were former executives of
Coast with knowledge of the litigation’s facts, putting them in charge of the
litigation in this manner, rather than via a management agreement like
Golden State entered, creates unnecessary issues under the legal ethics
paradigm.
From an ethics perspective, the Coast Savings deal created ambiguity as
to whom litigation counsel represents: the trustees, who controlled the litiga-
tion and who had duties to maximize the claim’s monetary value on behalf of
certificate holders, or Ahmanson, which nominally owned it?  Similarly
unclear are the implications of the answer to the latter question to the appli-
cation of the attorney-client privilege. Also, do the CPR Trust and Ahmanson
share a common legal interest that protects privilege regardless of who the
client actually is?146  And how should this structure be viewed from the cham-
perty perspective?
Ultimately, the Court of Claims entered a judgment of no damages in
2001, so the CPR Certificates were worthless.147  The CPR Trust appealed
and won at the Federal Circuit in 2002,148 but then the Government sought
and won a rehearing en banc.149  In 2003 the full court upheld the Court of
144 See Coast Federal Litig., Contingent Payment Rights Trust, supra note 83, at 7.  A
more detailed list of the Litigation Trustees’ power to control the litigation is in the Trust
Agreement appended to the prospectus.  See generally id. app. B, § 6.1 (detailing the Litiga-
tion Trustees’ various powers).
145 The Trust Declaration states:
[A]ny attorneys, experts, advisors, consultants and investigators retained by or at
the direction of the Litigation Trustees . . . shall be authorized by this Declaration to
accept directions from the Litigation Trustees with respect to the Litigation, notwith-
standing any conflict of interest that may arise by reason of such directions with the
interests of any party to this Declaration. The Litigation Trustees shall have no duty to
[Coast/Ahmanson] to consider any interest [such entity] may have with respect to the
Litigation.
Id. app. B, § 6.2(a) (emphasis added).
146 The Trust Declaration clearly states that communications among the trustees,
Ahmanson and counsel are privileged, id., but parties cannot create privilege by agree-
ment where the law does not afford it.
147 Coast Litigation Trust Announces Claims Court Entry of Judgment for Government, PR NEW-
SWIRE, Oct. 29, 2001, available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Coast+Litigation+Trust+
Announces+Claims+Court+Entry+of+Judgment+for. . .-a079509737.
148 Coast Litigation Trust Announces Appellate Court Decision in Favor of Coast Federal Bank,
PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 9, 2002, available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Coast+Litigation+
Trust+Announces+Appellate+Court+Decision+in+Favor+of. . .-a0132324006.
149 Coast Litigation Trust Announces Order Granting Government Petition for Rehearing of
Appellate Court Decision, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 15, 2003, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-
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Claims’ judgment of no damages,150 and the CPR Trust decided not to
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.151  The CPR Trust terminated, and the
CPR Certificates were de-listed on May 23, 2003.152
5. Strict Incorporation in the Information Resources Antitrust Litigation:
Contingent Value Rights
In July of 1996 Information Resources sued Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. and
others, alleging antitrust claims.  Information Resources alleged damages
exceeding $350 million, prior to trebling.153  The suit came nearly three
months after the European Union had begun formal proceedings against the
defendant for abusive practices.  Three months after the suit was filed, the
defendant entered into an agreement with the European Union to end its
abusive practices.154  A trial was scheduled for September 2004.155  However,
in 2003 Information Resources was negotiating a merger with Gingko Corpo-
ration, and the litigation posed a hidden cost problem.
To solve the problem, Information Resources formed a special purpose
(statutory) trust, which issued “Rights Certificates” tied to the proceeds of the
antitrust claim.  Unlike the Coast deal, however, Information Resources did
not transfer control of the claim to the trust.  As a result, it is more accurate
to say the trust received the monetary value of the claim rather than the
claim itself.  In some jurisdictions, the distinctions between (a) transferring
the value of the claim versus the claim itself and/or (b) transferring control
over the claim versus the value of the claim differentiated between a void
champertous transaction and a valid non-champertous transaction.156
Instead, a separate contract governed the conduct of the claim.  Under that
releases/coast-litigation-trust-announces-order-granting-government-petition-for-rehear
ing-of-appellate-court-decision-74366207.html.
150 Coast Litigation Trust Announces Appellate Court En Banc Decision in Favor of Govern-
ment, PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 25, 2003, available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/
coast-litigation-trust-announces-appellate-court-en-banc-decision-in-favor-of-government-
74762602.html.
151 Coast Litigation Trust Announces Decision Not to Seek Supreme Court Review and Termina-
tion of Litigation, PR NEWSWIRE, Apr. 24, 2003, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/
coast-litigation-trust-announces-decision-not-to-seek-supreme-court-review-and-termination-
of-litigation-70909392.html.
152 Coast Litigation Trust Announces Termination of Designation of CPR Certificates for Trad-
ing on NASDAQ and Termination of the Trust, PR NEWSWIRE, May 23, 2003, http://www
.prnewswire.com/news-releases/coast-litigation-trust-announces-termination-of-designa
tion-of-cpr-certificates-for-trading-on-nasdaq-and-termination-of-the-trust-55742192.html.
153 See Info. Res., Inc. Litig. Contingent Payment Rights Trust, Prospectus of Informa-
tion Resources, Inc. Litigation Contingent Payment Rights Trust (Form S-4/A3), at 2 (Oct.
30, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1260946/0001047469030
34778/a2119115zs-4a.htm [hereinafter Info. Res., Prospectus (Form S-4/A3)].
154 Id. at 17.
155 Id. at 2.
156 For example, New York distinguishes, at least to some extent, between claim trans-
fer and claim proceed transfer.  Steinitz & Field, supra note 50, at 727 n.68 (discussing New
York’s distinction between claim transfer and proceed transfer).
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contract the company that survived the merger (and thus owned the claim)
retained control of the settlement decision as well as influence over major
strategic choices.  Nonetheless, executives from the pre-merger claim owner
retained significant influence over major strategic decisions.
The Information Resources transaction was a more complicated deal
overall than the CPR Trust, largely because several investors/companies were
coming together to form a company that would merge into the publicly
traded Information Resources and take it private.  Thus, there were more
parties and more steps to the overall transaction.  In addition, the privately
held status of the surviving company and the newness of the trust created in
the deal meant that the certificates it issued could not be listed on the NAS-
DAQ, although they were tradable over the counter.157  (Complicating the
discussion of the deal further, the surviving entity retained the name “Infor-
mation Resources,” while becoming a wholly owned subsidiary of Gingko.  To
facilitate this discussion, when speaking of the post-merger entity, I use the
term “pmIR”; for pre-merger, it is simply “IR”; and because the trust was cre-
ated and certificates issued pre-merger, they are the “IR Trust” and the “IR
Rights Certificates.”)
The most important aspect of the IR deal, for purposes of expanding the
analysis of how claim incorporation can address the ethical issues raised by
litigation finance, is how the deal addressed control of the litigation.  Thus,
the agreement laying out those terms will be the focus of the discussion
below.
Within our narrow focus, certain core elements of the deal are the same:
a Delaware statutory trust was created via declaration (IR Trust Agreement)
among the acquirer, target, trust, and three trustee types—litigation, institu-
tional, and Delaware.  The main asset of the trust was the merged company’s
parent’s contractual commitment to pay proceeds of the litigation.  The trust
was given an initial endowment by the acquiring company to fund the litiga-
tion, after which the trust had to raise funds on its own by selling certificates
or borrowing funds.158  The litigation itself was “owned” by the acquiring
company and appeared on its books as a contingent asset.159  The trust
issued the certificates immediately before the merger closed; the certificates
were tradable but highly speculative and came with very limited rights.  And,
if the claim was successful, the certificates could be redeemed for cash based
on the amount of net proceeds received.160
However, the control of the litigation is crucially different than in the
Coast deal.  Under Coast Savings, the Litigation Trustees controlled the liti-
gation, and conflicts with the claim owner were resolved in favor of the trust.
In contrast, the IR Litigation Trustees were only empowered to raise funds
157 See SEC Declares Registration Statement for CVRs Effective; CVRS to Be Quoted on OTC
Bulletin Board on Completion of the Offer for Information Resources, Inc. by Gingko Acquisition
Corp., PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 30, 2003.
158 Info. Res., Prospectus (Form S-4/A3), supra note 153, at 3.
159 Id. at 15.
160 See id. at 1.
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for the litigation by selling more certificates or borrowing money, enforce
the Contingent Value Rights Agreement (Rights Agreement) and the IR
Trust Agreement, ensure the IR Trust’s compliance with the securities laws,
and undertake various trust/certificates related tasks.161  To manage the liti-
gation, the parties entered into the Rights Agreement that both governed the
conduct of the litigation and contained Ginkgo’s promise to pay the trust
when/if litigation proceeds came in.162
The Rights Agreement provided that five rights agents would manage
the litigation.163  Two would be appointed by IR (the CVR Rights Agents),
two by Gingko (the Parent Rights Agents), and one chosen by the other four
(the Independent Rights Agent).  The Rights Agreement explains the
breadth of the control granted:
The Rights Agents shall have the sole power and duty to direct and supervise
all matters involving the Litigation (including trial strategy and planning
and settlement strategy) on behalf of Parent, the Company, the Company
Subsidiaries and their Affiliates; provided that all decisions and determina-
tions with respect to the Litigation (including, without limitation, any Settle-
ment Decision or Strategic Decision) shall be made in accordance with
Section 3.1(d) hereof.164
The Rights Agreement also explains that as a general matter, the appoin-
tees of IR—the original, pre-merger plaintiff—will have day-to-day litigation
management:
Either one or both of the CVR Rights Agents (as they may mutually decide in
their discretion) shall have primary responsibility for the day-to-day direction
and supervision of the Litigation and may, without the approval of any of
Parent, the Company, the Company Subsidiaries[,] or any of the other
Rights Agents, make decisions and determinations in accordance with Sec-
tion 3.1(d) hereof with respect to the day-to-day conduct of the Litigation
and such decisions shall be deemed to made on behalf of all of the Rights
Agents.165
Nonetheless, the Rights Agreement explained, the two IR appointees/
CVR Rights Agents’ power was not unlimited because certain decisions
required the approval of at least three of the five rights agents:
Notwithstanding the foregoing, (i) the approval of a majority of the Rights
Agents (including the Independent Rights Agent) shall be required for any
Strategic Decision and (ii) the approval of a majority of the Rights Agents
(other than the Independent Rights Agent) shall be required for any Settle-
ment Decision.166
That is, for “Strategic Decisions,” either the Independent or Parent
Rights Agents could provide the third vote, but for settlement decisions, the
161 See id. at A-13 to -14.
162 See id. at 20–23.
163 Id. at 20.
164 Id. ex. B, art. III, § 3.1(c) (emphasis omitted).
165 Id.
166 Id.
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Parent Rights Agents had to agree.  Through this majoritarian provision, the
claim owner—the parent company—retains ultimate control of the litiga-
tion.  This delegation of authority is akin to the way legal ethics allow attor-
neys to make day-to-day decisions for their clients, but unlike legal ethics—
and like business entities—it creates a voting mechanism for resolving con-
flict between the parties and tailors the voting mechanism to allocate influ-
ence and control much more finely than attorney ethics does.
In fact, the Rights Agreement contained a further constraint on the
rights agents’ discretion by dictating what they had to consider in making
litigation decisions of any kind:
[T]he Rights Agents shall act in good faith with a view to maximizing the
present value of the Litigation Proceeds to the Company, the Company Sub-
sidiaries and the CVR Trust.  Without limiting the generality of the forego-
ing, in connection with any Settlement Decision, the Rights Agents shall
consider:
(A) the aggregate amount of After-Tax Litigation Proceeds to be received in
connection with the proposed settlement;
(B) the benefit to the Company and the Company Subsidiaries of any agree-
ments, commitments or undertakings to be made in connection with such
settlement that restrict future anti-competitive or allegedly anti-competitive
conduct by one or more parties to the Litigation;
[and the potential value of a future settlement if the current offer is
rejected, discounted to reflect the time value of money.]167
The criterion in (B) is striking and reflects the fact that while the IR
certificate holders would prefer (A) to be the only consideration—that is,
maximum cash—the antitrust nature of the litigation means that any remedy
of type (B) could be far more valuable to pm-IR.  (B) is a contractual require-
ment to put the interests of pm-IR ahead of the certificate holders.  This
allocation of power and preference to pm-IR/Gingko is further underscored
by the settlement veto the parent has per the provisions discussed above.
Combined, they illustrate how the commodification of claims that seems at
first blush inescapable can actually be avoided, through preemptively and
transparently resolving the conflict of interest through both (B) and the set-
tlement veto.
The prospectus makes this dynamic explicit and counsels potential IR
Certificate purchasers that:
The interests of Gingko Corporation in any settlement of the antitrust
litigation will not necessarily be aligned with the interests of the rights certifi-
cate holders.  For example, Gingko Corporation may prefer a settlement that
includes, in addition to cash payments, agreements by the defendants to refrain
from future unlawful anti-competitive conduct over an alternative settlement that
includes no such agreements, even if the alternative settlement offers higher cash pay-
ments.  On the other hand, the rights certificate holders . . . presumably would
prefer the alternative settlement offering higher cash payments, which would result in
167 Id. § 3.1(d)(A)–(B).
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correspondingly higher payments on the rights certificates.  In those circum-
stances, however, the rights agents appointed by Gingko Corporation would
be able to veto the alternative settlement, and any veto of that settlement
alternative would be final and binding . . . .168
On other key strategic issues, Gingko lacks a veto but gains influence
because three of the five rights agents must agree, and Gingko has two of the
five, and those two have equal say in a third.  Those key strategic issues in
which the merged corporation (successor to the claim) retains influence—
though not control—are:
[T]he appeal of any aspect of the antitrust litigation . . . the addition of any
claim or party; changing legal counsel or the basis for payment of attorneys’ fees; any
admission of liability with respect to any claim against Information
Resources in the antitrust litigation; or, any other proposed decision or
determination that . . . would represent a material change or development
in strategy . . . and result in a substantial likelihood that the recovery or
receipt of any amount of antitrust litigation proceeds . . . will be delayed.169
Because the selection of counsel and the retainer agreement is one of
the aspects of the litigation that the claim owner (Gingko) no longer con-
trols, champerty and attorney ethics may be implicated.  Regardless, the situ-
ation is not as extreme as the CPR deal because of the retained influence on
those decisions and because of the claim owner’s relationship to the entity it
shares control with.  Unlike the CPR deal, the trust is not the source of
Gingko’s loss of control.  Instead, it is the way the IR deal attempts to pre-
serve the corporate DNA of pre-merger IR: Gingko split control with the
ghost of a company that was now its subsidiary.  Champerty and attorney eth-
ics concerns seem very distant in this situation.
The issue of preventing privilege waiver is also simplified in the IR scena-
rio.  Since the litigation managing rights agents are not beholden to the
trust, “[t]he Rights Agents shall be deemed to be agents of [Gingko] and
[IR/pm-IR] for all purposes relating to evidentiary privileges, including attor-
ney-client privileges.”170
The IR litigation settled on February 16, 2006 for $55 million.  On May
16, 2006, the IR Trust announced the net share to be received by the Trust
and disbursed to certificate holders at $23,051,687, and stated that payment
would begin on June 15.  Each Rights Certificate was worth $0.7152.171
168 Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
169 Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
170 Id. ex. B, § 3.1(i).
171 Press Release, Info. Res., Inc. Litig. Contingent Payments Rights Trust, Info. Res.,
Inc. Litig. Contingent Payment Rights Trust Announces Commencement of Distribution
Process for Holders of Contingent Value Rights Certificates (May 16, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1260946/000110465906035301/a06-12014_1ex
99d1.htm.
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B. Inadvertent Incorporation: Crystallex
Crystallex International Corp.172 is an example of a strictly incorporated
claim that is striking in many respects, not least of which is its inadvertent
nature.  Crystallex is a gold mining company currently in bankruptcy in the
Canadian court system because Venezuela voided its rights to operate a mas-
sive mine in that country.  As a result of Venezuela’s action, Crystallex’s sin-
gle major asset is a multibillion dollar international arbitration claim against
Venezuela.173  The claim is the company.
As part of the bankruptcy process, Crystallex received debtor-in-posses-
sion financing.  Normally such financing is intended to enable a company to
restructure itself and emerge from bankruptcy.  In this situation, however,
nearly all of it served as litigation funding.174  The money came from a spe-
cialized investment fund that agreed to provide four tranches of capital, tied
to milestones (some of which were pegged to litigation developments),175 in
exchange for control rights, a commitment to repay principal and inter-
est,176 and a substantial slice of any eventual arbitral proceeds.  The Senior
Secured Credit Agreement177 gave control rights to the funder through two
vehicles: issuance of a special class of stock that empowered the funder to
nominate directors of the company, and contractual requirements to get the
assent of the funders’ directors to certain steps within the litigation.
Specifically, the funder was issued 100 Class A preference shares, Series
1.  Upon the trigger—drawing the second tranche—the funder had the right
to nominate two of the company’s five directors,178 and to co-nominate a
third director who was given “sole and ultimate authority” over the bank-
ruptcy proceedings, the rights of the parties under the funding agreement,
the management incentive plan, and the retention of professionals for any of
172 Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Rep. of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2
(Mar. 9, 2011).
173 See Tenth Report of the Monitor ¶¶ 59–60, In re A Plan of Compromise or Arrange-
ment of Crystallex Int’l Corp., No. CV-11-9532-00CL (Ont. Super. Ct. of Justice June 4,
2013), available at http://documentcentre.eycan.com/eycm_library/Project%20Gem/Eng
lish/Monitor’s%20Reports/Final%20Crystallex%20-%20Tenth%20Report%20of%20the%
20Monitor.pdf (calling the arbitration the company’s “main asset” and noting that other
than “minimal surplus processing equipment,” the company has no assets other than the
arbitration).
174 See id. ¶¶ 7–10 (describing what the debtor-in-possession budget was based on:
funding the arbitration, covering the costs of the bankruptcy proceedings (including litiga-
tion and negotiation with bondholders), paying the lender’s expenses, and revenue from
selling excess mining equipment).
175 See id.
176 See Redacted Motion Record, In re A Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Crys-
tallex Int’l Corp., No. CV-11-9532-00CL, ex. D (Form of Notice of Borrowing), at 78, 90
(Ont. Super. Ct. of Justice May 31, 2013), available at http://documentcentre.eycan.com/
eycm_library/Project%20Gem/English/Motion%20Materials/CCAA/Redacted%20Mo
tion%20Record%20returnable%20June%205,%202013.pdf.
177 See id.ex. D.
178 Id. ex. D, § 6.13(a)(1), at 31.
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those purposes.179  While this power generally gave the funder significant
influence over the company, more specific powers were conferred as well.
For example, the assent of a funder-appointed director was necessary for
board approval of transactions involving affiliates, certain types of executive
pay, retention of certain advisors, and a redacted term.180  Further, at least
one of the two funder directors had to agree before the company could
remove the arbitration counsel.181  In addition to those powers, at least one
funder appointee’s assent is needed for the company to take actions or deci-
sions described in several redacted provisions.182
Beyond the indirect control of the claim the funder gained by having
significant influence and control over the company itself, the funder gained
certain direct control and influence over the conduct of the arbitration.  For
example, the credit agreement requires the company to get the funder’s writ-
ten consent before it decides not to follow any material advice of its arbitra-
tion counsel, and before it agrees to settle for so little that the proceeds
would be insufficient to repay the funder its principal and interest.183  While
the various redacted terms make it impossible to fully assess how Crystallex
and its financier allocated control of the company and the claim, certain
terms—needing funder permission to reject counsel’s advice, change arbitra-
tion counsel, or accept a small settlement—are problematic under the cur-
rent legal ethics paradigm perspective.
A final set of financing provisions applied only if the arbitration was suc-
cessful and were designed to give the funder flexibility with respect to how it
received its payout.  One approach involved direct payments, but these were
limited in amount each year to avoid criminal usury; the alternative would
allow the funder to convert its right to proceeds into equity in Crystallex
special shares with voting, and dividend and preference rights.184
As of this writing, the Crystallex arbitration is ongoing.
C. The Treca Litigation Financing: Litigation Proceeds Trust
In October 2010, Burford Capital (Burford) invested in the so-called
Chevron-Ecuador dispute185 (the Burford Ecuadorian deal),186 an ongoing
179 See id. ex. D, § 6.14–.15, at 32–34.
180 Id. ex. D, § 6.16, at 34.
181 Id. ex. D, § 6.16(b)(iii), at 35.
182 See id. ex. D, § 6.16(a)(iv), at 34, (b)(i)–(ii), at 35, (b)(v), at 35 (all of which are
redacted).
183 See id. ex. D, § 7.16(a)–(b), at 39.
184 See id. ex. G.
185 Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No. 2011-0106 (Sucumbios Provincial Ct. of Jus-
tice of Nueva Loja App. Div. Jan. 3, 2012) (Ecuador), available at http://chevrontoxico
.com/assets/docs/2012-01-03-appeal-decision-english.pdf.
186 This deal, and specifically the underlying contract, is discussed in great detail in The
Litigation Finance Contract.  Steinitz, supra note 9.  The financing contract was by and
between Treca Financial Solutions and Claimants (including Friends of the Defense of the
Amazon), dated October 31, 2010. See Treca Financial Solutions and Claimants Funding
Agreement (Oct. 31, 2010), available at http://theamazonpost.com/wp-content/uploads/
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mass-tort litigation brought by Ecuadorians against Chevron over oil drilling-
related pollution.  Two facets of this deal are relevant to the incorporation
discussion.
First, Burford made use of a number of SPVs and received partial con-
trol over the conduct of the claim; however, Burford’s investment did not
constitute claim incorporation under my taxonomy.  These SPVs were not
devices created by the plaintiff to embody the claim (in whole or in part) but
simply were created and used by the funder to further the funder’s financing
objectives.  This function can be seen in both the investment mechanism,
which was indifferent to whether the funder was Burford or the SPV,187 and
in the funder’s partial control, i.e., influence over counsel,188 which would
also have been the same regardless of whether the funder was Burford or the
SPV.189  Given that the powers granted the contracting SPV were not differ-
Mastro-declaration-Exs-1-10-05jul11.pdf [hereinafter Treca Agreement].  Treca was created
solely to invest in the litigation. See Settlement Agreement, § 4(a)(vi), at 6, available at
https://lettersblogatory.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Burford-settlement.pdf
[hereinafter Burford Settlement Agreement].  The Settlement Agreement was entered
into by and among Chevron, the Burford Parties (Burford Capital and related entities),
and Ecuadorian Ventures, LLC.  In addition to Treca, the Burford Ecuadorian deal
involved other SPVs.  One is a Guernsey company called Nugent Investments Limited
(Nugent), which is Treca’s largest shareholder, and until December 30, 2010, was its only
shareholder. See id. at 2.  On that date Nugent sold four of the fifteen shares of Treca that
it owned to Ecuadorian Ventures, LLC, an Illinois limited liability company. Id.; id.
§ 4(a)(v), at 6, (b)(iv), at 7.  Through Treca, Burford was the major funder of the litiga-
tion, although a number of other funders participated as well. Steinitz, supra note 9, at
470.
187 For example, the financing contract called upon the funder to invest $4 million
immediately, and tentatively committed it to invest another $11 million split evenly into
two more tranches. See Steinitz, supra note 9, at 467.  Burford itself could have simply
given the initial $4 million to the Ecuadorian plaintiffs; its use of an SPV to do so related to
its own purposes, not the plaintiff’s financing needs.
188 Burford gained partial control by installing Patton Boggs, a firm with close ties to
Burford, as an “Active Lawyer” shaping the litigation and as the “Nominated Lawyers” who
controlled the purse strings.  Going forward, the plaintiffs could replace Active Lawyers as
they wished, but replacing the Nominated Lawyers would require the SPV/Burford
approval.  Regarding the relationship between the firms, see PATTON BOGGS, INVICTUS
MEMORANDUM, PATH FORWARD: SECURING AND ENFORCING JUDGMENT AND REACHING SETTLE-
MENT, available at http://www.earthrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Invictus-
memo.pdf (last visited Dec. 31, 2014) (report authored by plaintiffs’ counsel, setting out
the details of their enforcement strategies); see also Steinitz, supra note 9, at 497–98 &
n.182–88.  Regarding the role of the Active and Nominated Lawyers and how they could be
replaced, see Treca Agreement, supra note 186, §§ 2.3 at 4, 3.1–.2, at 5, 5.1–.2, at 6–7,
5.4–.5, at 7, 6.1, at 7, 7.6–.7, at 9, 7.9, at 9, 8.5(c), at 13; id. § 10.2, at 15 (treating disclosure
to the Nominated Lawyers as equivalent to disclosure to the Funder/Burford); id. § 13.1,
at 20, 13.5, at 21; id. sched. 1, sched. 3 (including a definition of “Nominated Lawyers”).
189 Burford invested several months after the law firm of Patten Boggs began advising
the Ecuadorian plaintiffs; absent Patten Boggs’s involvement, Burford would not have
invested.  As a result, it is hard to imagine Burford would have negotiated different terms
regarding the Nominated and Active Lawyers had Burford been directly investing. See
Roger Parloff, Litigation Finance Firm in Chevron Case Says It Was Duped by Patton Boggs, FOR-
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ent than those that Burford would have negotiated for itself directly, the SPV
approach was presumably used because doing so gave Burford tax, account-
ing, or other advantages unrelated to its relationship with the Ecuadorian
plaintiffs or their counsel.
Second, the financing contract contemplated a later, strict incorpora-
tion of the claim.  Specifically, the parties agreed that a trust would be cre-
ated and that the claim and any value due or received for it would belong to
the trust.190  Until such time, the trustee would have the sole right to control
the conduct of the claim and the enforcement of any judgment, except that
the trustee would itself be controlled, either by the plaintiffs’ lawyers or by a
“board of managers,” a term which was not defined.191  It is possible that a
trust was contemplated because the Ecuadorian judgment required that any
funds paid by defendants would be placed into a trust.  The judicially con-
templated trust, in turn, appears to be a solution devised to deal, at least in
part, with agency problems which may emerge when nonmonetary relief
(remediation, in that case) is involved.  The Ecuadorian judgment ordered
that a trust be established for the benefit of an NGO purporting to act on
behalf of the class (the Amazon Defense Front, or ADF), or those the ADF
designates, and that Chevron pay the damages awarded to that trust.  The
judgment further “directed that the trust’s board of directors be made up of
the ‘representatives of the Defense Front’ . . . and provided that the board
would choose the contractors who would perform the remediation.”192
(This kind of litigation governance through the use of legal entities, espe-
cially common law trusts, may be expanded to structured settlements, but I
leave an elaboration of this idea for another day.)
Regardless of whether the claim was ultimately incorporated, this invest-
ment has not gone well.  At first, it looked like a winner: an Ecuadorian judge
awarded the plaintiffs a $19 billion USD judgment for compensatory and
punitive damages in February 2011.193  However, Chevron contends that the
judgment was fraudulently obtained and is currently fighting its enforcement
on that basis.  As of this writing, the judgment is subject to an appeal in Ecua-
dor, an ICSID arbitration, an anti-enforcement injunction in the United
States, and numerous enforcement actions around the globe.194  In addition,
TUNE (Apr. 17, 2013, 5:16 PM), http://fortune.com/2013/04/17/litigation-finance-firm-
in-chevron-case-says-it-was-duped-by-patton-boggs/; Jan Wolfe, Patton Boggs Accuses Burford
of Betrayal in Chevron Case, LITIG. DAILY (June 21, 2013), http://www.litigationdaily.com/
id=1202607991795/Patton-Boggs-Accuses-Burford-of-Betrayal-in-Chevron-Case?slreturn=
20140926125213.
190 See Treca Agreement, supra note 186, § 8.1(a), at 10.
191 See id. § 8.1(b), at 10.
192 Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
193 See Roger Parloff, No-show Judge Bolsters Chevron’s Attack on $19 Billion Judgment, FOR-
TUNE (May 17, 2013, 4:10 PM), http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2013/05/17/judge-
chevron-ecuador-2/.
194 All of these actions are discussed in Manuel A. Go´mez, The Global Chase: Seeking the
Recognition and Enforcement of the Lago Agrio Judgment Outside of Ecuador, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX
LITIG. 429, 430 (2013).
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Chevron has sued the lead plaintiffs’ lawyers alleging RICO and other viola-
tions in connection with alleged fraud and corruption through which the
judgment was allegedly obtained.  It has recently won the action (which is
subject to an appeal).195  Patton Boggs was named as a “co-conspirator” but
not a defendant in that suit and has settled it.196  In April 2013, Burford,
Chevron, and others entered a settlement agreement under which Burford
renounced its right to receive any proceeds of the litigation, and Chevron
and Burford agreed to release each other from any claims relating to the
Chevron/Ecuador litigation.197  Burford also agreed as part of the settlement
to dissolve the primary SPV, Treca Financial Solutions, through which the
funding was effectuated.198
Beyond illustrating funder financing tactics and a possible form of claim
incorporation, this deal illustrates the very features of litigation finance that
render bringing in corporate law and practices, especially corporate govern-
ance practices, obviously beneficial for both funder and funded.  First, it
exposes the high degree of risk funders face.  Burford may very well have
been defrauded by the plaintiffs and the controlling lawyers it selected.  The
jury on that is, quite literally, still out.199  But even if it was not defrauded,
Burford has faced great cost and reputational harm for having made this
particular investment.  And since it has become, de facto if not de jure, a real
party in interest to the Chevron/Ecuador litigation through its investment, it
has gotten enmeshed as a (potential) party in the underlying litigation.  Sec-
ond, it exposes the extreme information asymmetry characterizing litigation
195 See generally Chevron Corp., 974 F. Supp. 2d 362.
196 See Roger Parloff, Chevron Seeks to Sue Patton Boggs for Fraud and Deceit, FORTUNE (May
13, 2013, 10:16 AM), http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2013/05/13/chevron-seeks-
to-sue-patton-boggs-for-fraud-and-deceit.
197 See Burford Settlement Agreement, supra note 186.  Burford, through Treca, ini-
tially invested $4 million and thereby purchased the right to receive 5.545% of the pro-
ceeds. See Treca Agreement, supra note 186, sched. 1, § 3(e), 3(h).  Although it refused to
make further investments and later terminated the funding contract, it retained the right
to that percentage until renouncing it in the settlement. See Burford Settlement Agree-
ment, supra note 186, § 1, at 3; Treca Agreement, supra note 186, § 7, at 7, 11.3, at 18.
198 Although Burford’s settlement agreement with Chevron is not explicit on this point,
it appears that Nugent (Treca’s largest shareholder, and, originally, sole shareholder)
exists for reasons beyond the Chevron/Ecuador investment because the agreement does
not require Burford to dissolve Nugent, though it does require Burford to dissolve Treca.
See Burford Settlement Agreement, supra note 186, § 4(a)(vi), at 6.  Similarly suggestive
but unclear is the Settlement Agreement’s reference to other companies as part of the
“Burford Parties,” namely, Litigation Risk Solutions, a Delaware LLC, and a company iden-
tified only as “Glenavy.”  Glenavy is defined in the introductory paragraph of the agree-
ment as one of the Burford Parties and is identified in one of the recitals as having
received a subpoena from Chevron as part of its RICO suit against the Ecuadorian plain-
tiffs, but otherwise Glenavy does not appear in the document. See Burford Settlement
Agreement, supra note 186, pmbl. (“Settlement Agreement” and “Recitals”).  Nor is there
any indication of where it was formed or whether Glenavy is its full name. See generally
Burford Settlement Agreement, supra note 186.
199 See Chevron Corp., 974 F. Supp. 2d at 478–79.
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funding deals.  And, third, in Burford’s re-alignment with Chevron and
denouncement of the plaintiffs, while an unusual scenario, we find an illus-
tration of the types of conflicts to which these arrangements may give rise.200
III. THE INCORPORATION PARADIGM: USING LEGAL ENTITIES TO ELIMINATE
THE HIDDEN COSTS AND GOVERN LITIGATION
A. The Problems Solved and the Problems Created in the Real-world Examples
As discussed at the outset, the use of securities tied to litigation pro-
ceeds, the use of an SPV, and at times both, is a single mechanism that can
both resolve certain hidden costs of litigation and assist in managing the ethi-
cal challenges implicated by litigation finance.  The following paragraphs
generalize and elaborate on how they do so beyond the deal-specific analysis
in the previous Part.
1. Corporate Deal-Making and Corporate Finance
a. Reducing the Hidden Costs of Litigation in Certain Mergers,
Acquisitions, and Large Equity Investments
As illustrated by the discussion of the deals above, both loose and strict
incorporations can and have been used to solve company valuation problems
when a claim’s value is material relative to the value of the company, but not
so large that the claim becomes the company, and the company wants to
merge, be acquired, or receive a large equity investment.  Without incorpora-
tion of the claim, the difficulties in valuation have made it very difficult or
even impossible to undertake such transactions, creating the problem of the
hidden cost of litigation.  This cost may well dwarf the apparent costs of litiga-
tion, namely attorneys’ fees and legal expenses.
b. Monetizing Claims that Currently Go Unremedied and Litigation
Finance as Corporate Finance
The ability to cabin off litigation in an SPV, the liquidity that can be
provided by embodying litigation in a security (with or without an SPV),201
and the ability to raise funds directly for the pursuit of a litigation and do so
on an ongoing basis (by issuing additional securities) may induce corpora-
tions, governments, and other sophisticated actors to pursue legal claims that
currently go unremedied.  As the risk of incurring the hidden costs of litiga-
tion is reduced, the incentive to commence and pursue (as opposed to settle,
200 See generally Steinitz, supra note 9 (discussing extreme information asymmetry,
extreme risk, and extreme agency costs (conflicts of interests) as characteristics of litiga-
tion as an asset).
201 On the significance of the possibility of a market in shares as a significant upside of
organizational law generally, see, e.g., Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1335 (2006).
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at a discount) meritorious claims increases (depending on one’s view of the
desired level of litigation in society this is either a benefit or a detriment).202
2. Litigation Finance
a. Control and Conflicts of Interests
As discussed above, the primary concern raised by both critics and pro-
ponents of litigation finance is that funders may obtain control of the claim
and use it to further their own interests at the expense of the interests of the
authentic owners of the claim, the plaintiffs.  As also discussed, this is the
familiar problem of the separation of ownership and control.  Shareholders
often have little control over how their companies are managed.  Sharehold-
ers have little ability to propose alternative directors,203 shape executive com-
pensation,204 and otherwise govern their agents.  Because this problem is
both profound and old, corporate law has developed multiple responses:
[F]ive legal strategies [are identified] that the law employs to address
[agency] problems. . . . Some legal strategies are “regulatory” insofar as they
directly constrain the actions of corporate actors: for example, a standard of
behavior such as a director’s duty of loyalty and care.  Other legal strategies
are “governance-based” insofar as they channel the distribution of power
and payoffs within companies to reduce opportunism.  For example, the law
may accord direct decision rights to a vulnerable corporate constituency, as
when it requires shareholder approval of mergers.  Alternatively, the law may
assign appointment rights over top managers to a vulnerable constituency, as
when it accords shareholders—or in some jurisdictions, employees—the
power to select corporate directors.205
Let us illustrate how to apply these strategies to the incorporation of
legal claims.  Among the most fundamental mechanisms are the fiduciary
duties that directors and officers owe shareholders, namely the duty of care
202 See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive
to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997); Steven Shavell, The Level of Litigation:
Private Versus Social Optimality of Suit and of Settlement, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 99 (1999)
(arguing that the privately determined level of litigation can depart from the socially opti-
mal level in either direction because litigants do not take into account either the negative
or positive externalities that their litigation creates—thus, corrective social policy may help
to remedy the divergence).
203 See Key Issues: Proxy Access, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER, http://www.pwc.com/us/en/
corporate-governance/proxy-access.jhtml (last visited Dec. 31, 2014).
204 Jesse Eisinger, In Shareholder Say-On-Pay Votes, More Whispers than Shouts, N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/in-shareholder-say-on-pay-votes
-more-whispers-than-shouts/?_r=0.
205 John Armour et al., Abstract, Agency Problems, Legal Strategies and Enforcement (Euro-
pean Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 135/2009, 2009), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1436555.  The authors detail ten strategies
that generally comprise the law’s methods of dealing with agency problems, four regula-
tory and six related to governance. See id. at 23.  Since these are general strategies, all can
be applied to the regulation and governance of incorporated legal claims. See id.
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and the duty of loyalty.206  These duties aim to prevent self-dealing, bad faith,
and actions against the corporation’s and shareholders’ best interest.  Under
certain structures, the use of an SPV could mean that funders become
officers, with fiduciary duties, and not only owners.
Further examples of how corporate governance principles can inspire
litigation governance can be gleaned by turning to the area of incentive
alignment through executive compensation.207  For example, compensating
executives with options has become a popular practice on the theory that it
aligns the managers’ interests with those of the owners.  As the limitations of
this method became evident, it has been refined.208  For example, some cor-
porations require executives to hold on to some or all of their options and
have “skin in the game” to discourage short-termism.  Another option is claw-
backs: contractual rights to have compensation returned in case of under-
performance in the long run.209  Similarly, funders can be required to hold
on to some or all of their litigation proceed rights until the litigation is
concluded.210
There are other efforts to address agency problems that tend to be
embedded in corporate practices and are executed via contracts rather than
statutes.  In two of the deals, potential agency problems were resolved via
contracts that specified principles of litigation governance in detail.  As part
of the Golden State-Cal Fed merger, both the Golden State LTWs and the
Cal Fed participation rights were governed by the Litigation Management
Agreement, which demarcated precisely how the litigation would be man-
aged.  That contract also spelled out whom the agents reported to, and how
206 See, e.g., A.L.I. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01 (1994) (concerning
the duty of care of directors and officers, the business judgment rule, as well as principles
of corporate governance); id. § 5.01 (concerning the duty of fair dealing of directors,
senior executives, and controlling shareholders, as well as principles of corporate govern-
ance); Robert Rosenberg, Fiduciary Duties and Potential Liabilities of Directors and Officers of
Financially Distressed Corporations, LATHAM & WATKINS (2003), available at http://www.iii
global.org/component/jdownloads/finish/393/1422.html; see also Sebok & Wendel, supra
note 58, at 1836 (arguing for good faith rather than fiduciary duties).
207 For a review of various approaches to aligning executive compensation with the
interests of the corporation, see Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation,
69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1821, 1821 (2012).
208 On the promise of using restricted stock options, see Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta
Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the Long-term, 26 YALE
J. ON REG. 359, 363 (2009).  On the shortcomings of using options and other equity
approaches to compensate executives, see Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure:
Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000–2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 260
(2010); Kaal, supra note 207, at 1822–24, 1828–29 (citing Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger
Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 249 (2010)).
209 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the
Issues, 17 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 9 (2005) (proposing solutions to pay structure flaws that
de-link compensation from performance).
210 Indeed, the Coast Litigation Trustees had to retain at least 50% of their certificates
during their tenure as Litigation Trustees. See Coast Fed. Litig., Contingent Payment
Rights Trust (Form S-4), supra note 83, app. B, § 3.7(b), at 50.
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the agents could be removed.211  The IR deal similarly involved a litigation
management contract that allocated control of the litigation, giving some of
it to the pre-merger company, and some—including settlement—to the post-
merger parent company.212  Litigation governance contracts like these,
which specify who has how much power to take which decisions, are perhaps
the most direct way to resolve the agency issues.
Where an SPV is used, the constitutional documents of the entity can
also be used to define the purpose of the entity and the obligations of its
officers in a manner that minimizes conflicts.  Thus, a single SPV may be
used for multiple litigations should a plaintiff and funder choose to join
forces on more than one suit.  In such a case, the SPV would reduce the
transaction costs of negotiating a separate contract for each litigation.213
Using an SPV can also help clarify the duties of the attorney in the attor-
ney-client-funder triumvirate, thus resolving or minimizing the set of con-
flicts between the client and its attorney that are created when a third party,
the funder, pays the attorneys’ bill—especially if that funder-attorney rela-
tionship is a repeat-play relationship.214  Now, the SPV can be the client of
the attorney and, so long as the funder is either a director or officer of the
SPV and thus owes it fiduciary duties, those conflicts can be regulated.  Using
an SPV to manage funder-funded conflicts would fail, however, if the funder
does not have such a duty to the SPV.
The continuum described in Part III—of transferring no control, some
control, or total control of the claim when incorporating it—represent differ-
ent modalities of dealing with the agency problems that arise once ownership
and control are separated in the context of a financed or spun-off litigation.
Loose incorporation always resolves these tensions by contract.  In the con-
211 See Golden State Bancorp Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 11, 1998), availa-
ble at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1019508/0000950136-98-001646.txt.  The
Litigation Management Agreement was by and among Golden State Bancorp Inc., Glen-
dale Federal Bank, Federal Savings Bank, California Federal Bank, A Federal Savings Bank,
Stephen J. Trafton and Richard A. Fink.  Trafton and Fink were the designated litigation
managers for each case, who reported to committees of the board of directors specifically
create for each case and were vested with the power of the board as regards the litigation,
including rights to remove the litigation managers for cause. See First Nationwide Hold-
ings Inc., Litigation Management Agreement (Form 8-K), supra note 110, arts. I, II, at
2–11.
212 See generally Coast Fed. Litig., Contingent Payment Rights Trust (Form S-4), supra
note 83, § 3.7, at B-11 to -12; id. ex. B, at B-41.
213 The question of what legal entities add to mere contracts, given that at core they
can be understood as standard contracts, is an important question when selecting between
loose and strict incorporation and a question that has received substantial treatment in
corporate legal theory but a full treatment of it is beyond the scope of this Article.  For
some answers to this question, see Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 AM. L.
ECON. REV. 1 (2006) (explaining why publically traded corporations rarely deviate from the
default terms of state corporation law in their charters); Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000).
214 See VICKI WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS (2008); Steinitz, supra note 8, at 1280;
ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 39; N.Y.C. BAR OPINION, supra note 36.
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text of a publicly issued security, whether as a spinoff or, if an underwriter
were willing, through a litigation-funding IPO, control stays with the original
plaintiff.  The claim ownership rights embodied in the security are too frag-
mented for a security holder to be given any control, and in any case, the
security holders only enter the transaction after its terms are set.  If the secur-
ity were done via private placement to a single funder or a very small number
of funders, one could imagine them contracting for partial or full control
transfer.  Middle ground is possible, where a plaintiff sets the terms of its
security and then markets its private placement via a road show to a much
larger number of qualified investors.  Such investors need not be PELF inves-
tors and may not seek much control.215
The legal ethics paradigm treats these permutations differently because
of its focus on the degree of control transfer, and would be more approving
of a funding IPO than the arms-length negotiated deal with a PELF.  A close
examination, however, reveals that this approach is suboptimal in terms of
promoting public policies.  If underwriters were willing to issue litigation
funding IPOs, such originate-and-distribute deals could create a moral haz-
ard (investing other peoples’ money and shifting the risk to buyers of the
securities) and, consequently, a risk to the court system by flooding it with
nonmeritorious claims.216  This is much less socially desirable than a PELF
deal even though the separation of ownership and control is greater in the
latter.  The incorporation paradigm in contrast, allows us to clearly see that
such a preference for an IPO over a PELF deal would be undesirable.
If securities are involved, the potential for tension between ownership
and control is greatest with the strict incorporation approach, as evidenced
by the Coast Savings example.  But that tension need not exist if ownership of
the claim as well as control of it is transferred to the SPV.  If the entire claim
is transferred to the SPV—Coast Federal without Ahmanson’s continued
claim of ownership and accounting for the claim, or the Treca trust, if cre-
ated—then not only is the tension absent, but by structuring ownership, the
bylaws and roles within the SPV, control can be allocated among the parties
however they wish without necessarily raising any agency issues.  The Crystal-
lex deal illustrates some of the possibilities.  The Board of Managers envi-
sioned by the Treca Agreement would perhaps have been another such
vehicle.  One can envision such Board of Managers as including plaintiff rep-
resentatives analogous to lead plaintiffs in class action, as well as their litiga-
tion counsel and a funder representative.  The Board of Managers’
membership, like the IR rights agents, could have voting powers that give a
settlement veto to the plaintiffs, but nonetheless give funders a vote and thus
influence.  The IR deal itself reflects the overall flexibility of the incorpora-
tion paradigm.  The trust features that made its issuance of the proceed right
215 See Painter, supra note 10, at 638; Maya Steinitz & Abigail C. Field, The Model and the
Securities Laws, Coda, A MODEL LITIG. FIN. CONTRACT (July 29, 2013), http://litigationfin
ancecontract.com/the-model-and-the-securities-laws-coda/.
216 See Steinitz, supra note 8, at 1321 (discussing the prospect of securitizing legal
claims and the potential attendant dangers).
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certificates more deal-appropriate than having pm-IR or the new parent,
Gingko, issue them could be realized, but control transfer could be finely
customized by contract.  Again, the legal ethics paradigm approaches these
deal structures differently, but its touchstone—claim control—seems to be
simply one of the central, negotiated deal points, rather than the sine qua
non deal point excluded from negotiation amongst sophisticated actors by
operation of bar association regulation.217  An incorporation paradigm more
appropriately assesses the deal as a business transaction.  The judgment of
these deals should use the standards for dealmaking and decisionmaking
developed in the business law context.
b. Information Asymmetry and the Attorney-Client Privilege
The funder-funded relationship is characterized by information barriers,
predominantly the fear of waiving attorney-client privilege by communicating
with the funder,218 and extreme information asymmetry due to the fact that
the plaintiff has better, private information.  Funders may also have material
private information.
Information barriers and asymmetry can be addressed using securities
structures, whether loose or strict, to the same extent they can be in the more
typical non-recourse loan scenario, so long as the securities issuance is an
arms-length private placement.  That is, so long as it is practical to enter con-
fidentiality agreements that preserve work product protection information,
asymmetry about the facts of the case can be minimized.219  However, if a
publicly traded security is used, information asymmetry becomes reinforced
rather than mitigated.  That is, the plaintiff will not want to publicly disclose
any information that would result in work product or privilege waiver.
Instead, the disclosures will resemble those of the CPR (Coast) Trust’s,
namely, announcements of case developments otherwise in the public
record.
If a strict incorporation approach is used, positioning both the funder
and the plaintiff as officers of the SPV, privilege issues for communications
between them would evaporate as they would be co-representatives of the
SPV client for all dealings with counsel.  Privilege issues could also be
resolved under loose incorporation structures if the funder’s litigation man-
agers were subject to sufficient control by the plaintiff, as in the Golden State
example.  Whether a funder would agree to such control is a different ques-
tion.  Also unclear is whether entering a litigation management agreement of
217 See Anthony J. Sebok, Should the Law Preserve Party Control? Litigation Investment, Insur-
ance Law and Double Standards, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at
1), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2271762.
218 Though in at least some U.S. jurisdictions that risk is greatly minimized through the
operation of the attorney work-product doctrine.  For a discussion of both, see Steinitz &
Field, supra note 50, at 730–34.
219 Id. at 733–34 (analyzing the extent to which the work product doctrine can be pre-
served despite the introduction of a funder and the extent to which it overlaps, in its scope
of protection, with the attorney-client privilege).
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the type used in the IR example would preserve privilege when the parties
are not parties to a merger but are instead engaging in a joint venture, which
is the essence of claim incorporation in the litigation finance, rather than
hidden costs, context.  Perhaps the agreement could serve to demonstrate
the common legal interest necessary to preserve privilege.220
c. Uncertainty, Pricing, and Transparency
By embodying the value of a litigation in a security which is capable of
trading, litigation—notoriously difficult to value because of the
nonmonotonic and discontinuous nature of settlement values221, and
because of the absence of comparables and of a transparent market222—
becomes subject to pricing via markets.  Furthermore, the ability to issue
additional shares in the future allows plaintiffs to avoid overselling (i.e., sell-
ing a larger portion of the claim than they have to) at the outset and/or
selling at a steep discount when their bargaining position is the weakest.223
Instead, as more information is revealed about the value of the litigation
through the litigation process, risk is reduced, and additional shares can be
priced accordingly.  If a robust market develops, the accumulation of trans-
parent pricing data, currently absent with respect to legal settlements, can
reduce pricing problems across deals.  Finally, by avoiding uncertainty as to
whether any given deal is champertous or not, a risk factor that is currently
raising the cost of financing for plaintiffs will be removed.
d. Commodification
Embodying a claim in a security, whether in connection to a strict or
loose form of incorporation, is commodification in its purest form.  However,
220 An exception to the doctrine that disclosure to a third party waives attorney-client
privilege is called the common interest doctrine.  The contours of the doctrine vary by
state, and can be incoherent even within a state.  Importantly, while parties must agree that
the common legal interest exists, their agreement alone cannot give rise to such an interest
because the parties cannot create privilege by agreement when it otherwise does not exist.
A challenge normally for funder-funded relationships is that a common commercial inter-
est is easy to establish, but a common legal one is not. See Steinitz & Field, supra note 50, at
730.  However, if the parties are contractually agreeing to co-manage a litigation for a com-
mon purpose as defined in the litigation management agreement—the IR agreement, e.g.,
lays out how settlement offers are to be evaluated—then their relationship seems much
closer than simply that of codefendants agreeing to cooperate in their defense, which is
the situation the common interest doctrine arose from.  Thus a privilege preserving com-
mon legal interest would plausibly exist.  The idea is simply too novel, however, for any on-
point precedent.
221 See Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real
Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1272–73 (2006); Robert J. Rhee, The Effect of Risk
on Legal Valuation, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 193, 193 (2007).
222 See Yeazell, supra note 12, at 143–44 (explaining that while there are numerous legal
settlements, the legal claims market is unusual in that there is no available information
about their values because most settlements tend to be confidential).
223 See Steinitz & Field, supra note 50, at 741–44 (discussing “hold-up”).
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steps can be taken to mitigate the implications.  The most potent is the
approach taken in the IR deal, namely to provide explicit direction requiring
certain types of nonmonetary relief to be sought and prioritized even at the
expense of a reduced monetary award, coupled with a disclosure of this
arrangement to the proceed rights holders.  One can imagine a litigation
finance contract that funded an antitrust claim containing similar language.
That said, the commodification inherent in reducing claims to securities,
tradable or not, is the reason this approach is inappropriate to claim types
other than commercial claims owned by corporations, wealthy individuals,
or, in certain cases, sovereigns.
e. Transaction Costs
The transaction costs of doing a private placement of securities need not
be materially larger than negotiating a more typical funding contract, unless
it is a private placement involving a formal offering memorandum and a road
show.  Then the costs are much higher.  However, if retaining full control of
the claim is a crucial deal point and the claim is large enough that litigating it
will be so costly that financing is attractive, these costs may be justified.  Simi-
larly, if a claim is embodied in a publicly traded security, the costs are high.
These are all the costs of drafting and registering the prospectus and ongo-
ing compliance costs.224  These costs are even higher if a trust or other SPV is
used in conjunction with the public security, because then there are the addi-
tional costs of creating the SPV, its own compliance costs, and the compensa-
tion of the SPV’s directors, officers, or trustees.
f. Investor Protection
Currently, there is a lack of clarity as to whether (some or all) litigation
finance contracts are securities.225  By following well-recognized deal pat-
terns, whether and what kind of security is involved and what kind of securi-
ties regulation applies becomes much easier to discern.
* * *
In sum, incorporating legal claims is a practice that holds the potential
of significantly minimizing the Funding Challenges and carries additional
benefits such as improving investor protection.
B. Trusts and Beyond: Using Various Legal Entities for Financed
or Spun-off Claims
Accepting the idea that the funding of a commercial claim is a joint
venture brings to stark relief at least two key features of litigation finance.
One is the key difference between the funder-plaintiff relationship—which is
224 See Painter, supra note 10, at 634–35.
225 See Couture, supra note 90, at 5.
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that of co-venturers—and the contingency lawyer-client relationship—which
is an attorney-client relationship.  What follows from this difference is that
while allocating control over key decisions to an attorney may not be appro-
priate, allocating control to a co-owner is appropriate in certain circum-
stances.  The other, related difference is the fact that conflicts of interest run
both ways in the funder-plaintiff relationship.  While the funder may be
tempted to maximize its profits at the expense of its JV partner, the claimant,
the latter may also try to take advantage of its JV partner, the funder.  Yes, the
funder may push for an early settlement in order to reinvest in other litiga-
tions in its portfolio.226  But the claimant may push to overinvest in its case
either because it is heavily concentrated in it or because the claimant may be
more emotional about it.227
These conflicts of interest are a direct result of the separation of the
ownership and control of the claim.  Business law has developed (partial)
solutions to these problems over the years.228  These solutions are embodied
in (1) the different types of business entities, understood as sets of organiza-
tional choices which have evolved over time to produce internal coher-
ence,229 and (2) principles of corporate governance.
The rest of this Section looks at a few illustrative examples of business
entities, with an emphasis on the different forms of corporate governance
they offer, to see how they might address the separation of ownership and
control in the context of litigation finance and litigation governance.  The
Section compares them along a few dimensions, including relative complex-
ity and formality, access to capital, and ease of transfer of interests.  This Sec-
tion seeks only to illustrate how choice of entity can influence issues
implicated by the separation of ownership and control.  It is not intended to
be an exhaustive survey of either the entities that can be used nor of the
important dimensions of entity selection analysis.230  It is also important to
226 For an elaborate discussion of the conflicts created by the fact that funders invest in
portfolios of litigations, see Steinitz & Field, supra note 50, at 735–41.
227 Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at
the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 79–81 (1997) (“Litigants litigate not just for
money, but to attain vindication; to establish precedent; to express their feelings . . . .
[T]heir decisions to settle or litigate may be affected by . . . [their] self-serving biases con-
cerning the fairness of their position, habit, unyielding conceptions of justice, and myriad
other factors.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting another source) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
228 See LEE A. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ENTITIES 2 (2011) (“[A]gency [law] is in many ways the real back-story [of] . . . organiza-
tional form[s].  In fact, . . . doctrines[ ] like partnership law and corporate law[ ] are
merely an outgrowth of agency principles.”).
229 See generally LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION (2010).
230 For an in-depth analysis of the considerations that go into entity selection, see gen-
erally id.; see also Henry Hansmann, Ownership and Organizational Form, in THE HANDBOOK
OF ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS 891, 891–917 (Robert Gibbons & John Roberts eds., 2013);
Henry Hansmann et al., The New Business Entities in Evolutionary Perspective, 8 EUR. BUS. ORG.
L. REV. 59, 60 (2007); Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183,
186–223 (2004).
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note that from a deal-specific perspective, additional and possibly idiosyn-
cratic considerations may come into play.  For example, key deal-specific con-
siderations as to which legal entity to use are likely to be the tax and
accounting consequences of the structure in the context of the claim and
claimant.  Such deal-specific considerations are also outside the scope of this
Article.
1. Statutory Trusts
Two of the spinoff deals discussed used statutory trusts as security-issuing
entities to which claim proceeds and perhaps control were transferred.
Among the various available forms, these entities have certain advantages.
They are rigid, passive, and well understood.  Simultaneously, their rigidity
does not eliminate flexibility, in that the powers of the trustee, the corpus of
the trust, and the terms of the securities can be customized.  In addition, they
are routinely used for financing and security issuance.  Access to capital is
limited solely by the attractiveness of the terms of the certificates the trust
issues, and transferability of the certificates can be customized within the
bounds of the securities laws.
To leverage trust doctrine to minimize or resolve the conflicts of interest
between the funder and the funded, defining the trustees’ powers is key.
The IR and Coast Federal deals show the tension; the certificate holders want
maximum financial return, which may or may not be what the plaintiff wants.
IR resolved the conflict by retaining control of the litigation, so it could pur-
sue nonmonetary relief freely, and simply told certificate holders that the
conflict was resolved against them.  Coast Federal resolved the conflict in
favor of the certificate holders, and informed Ahmanson (the claim owner)
accordingly.
One could imagine the optimal use of a trust to finance a claim and
resolve conflicts of interest would be a deal in which the plaintiff and
funder(s) were both trustees and certificate holders, the claim involved only
monetary remedies, the trust corpus was the right to receive the net proceeds
of the claim, and the trustees controlled the litigation.  This approach would
impose fiduciary duties on both the funder and plaintiff, binding them to the
same commercial goal (maximizing the net proceeds).  Funders are unlikely
to find the fiduciary duty attractive, but it is possible to imagine that allocat-
ing decisional power among the trustees would give the funder comfort that
the fiduciary duty would not force it to act too strongly against its own inter-
est.  In addition, the ability to raise additional funds by issuing certificates to
other funders without making those second-wave funders trustees could be
quite appealing.  Similarly, to the extent a funder could sell some or all of its
certificates while retaining (or even relinquishing) trustee status/litigation
control, a funder might find the trust attractive.
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2. Partnerships
Perhaps the oldest and simplest business form is the partnership.  Part-
nerships resolve mutual conflicts of interest by imposing a reciprocal fiduci-
ary duty,231 do not separate ownership and management, and allocate
management responsibility laterally by agreement.  Unlike with corporations,
management is not stratified into a board of directors and an officer tier.232
The greatest downside of partnerships—liability for other partners’
acts—is a relatively minor issue in the litigation finance context because most
actions of the partnership are not directed toward external clients/customers
the way most businesses are.  The simplicity of partnerships and the relatively
low liability risk makes this arrangement theoretically the most effective, effi-
cient way to resolve the funder-funded conflicts.  However, the general his-
torical trend has been away from the partnership form due to the restrictive
nature of both the fiduciary duty and joint and several liability.  For the same
reasons, it is likely that both funders and clients may wish to restrict their
reciprocal duties and limit their liability.233
A final consideration is that partnerships’ ability to raise capital is lim-
ited to the partners’ assets and borrowing ability, i.e., they draw on a limited
reservoir.234  This issue is less pressing in the litigation finance context
because most funders take on cases assuming they will fund the case them-
selves, or through syndicates they have put in place, and thus presumably
could bring sufficient capital to the table.  Finally, partnership interests are
difficult to transfer.  One can imagine that funders may lean in favor of ease
of transfer while plaintiffs may be better served by requiring funders to main-
tain “skin in the game.”  A notable consideration is that heavily restricted
securities do not lend themselves to the originate-and-distribute model, a
restriction that is beneficial for plaintiffs.  However, some funders express the
opposite concern, wanting to ensure plaintiffs have skin in the game in the
form of retained ownership.
3. Corporations
Most corporations are entities that involve a complete separation of own-
ership and control for most decisions.  While shareholders have the last word
on certain points, for the most part, control is vested in a board of directors
and in officers (who may also be shareholders).  The exception to this basic
structure is the “close corporation,” a privately held entity that can give share-
holders or third parties topic-specific director or executive level powers (and
231 For a discussion of fiduciary duties in partnerships, see Michael Haynes, Partners
Owe to One Another a Duty of the Finest Loyalty . . . . or Do They? An Analysis of the Extent to Which
Partners May Limit Their Duty of Loyalty to One Another, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 433, 434 (2005).
232 HARRIS, supra note 228, at 69, 188.
233 On the historical shift away from partnerships towards corporations and uncorpora-
tions and, within the latter category, especially towards the LLC, see, e.g., RIBSTEIN, supra
note 229, at 59–60.
234 See id. at 43–44.
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duties), and can eliminate the board of directors entirely, effectively incorpo-
rating a partnership.235  Like partnerships, however, close corporations have
been trending down.
Corporate law has long recognized the conflicts of interest created by
separating ownership and control, and has used both statutory and common
law fiduciary duties and governance doctrines to minimize them.  Managers
must be loyal and avoid self-dealing, while pursuing the company’s—share-
holders’—best interests.  Governance theories have involved aligning finan-
cial incentives through compensation structures, easing accountability by
making directorships all expire at the same time, increasing transparency
and accountability by having independent directors and compensation and
audit committees, and similar efforts.  Finally, Congress and regulators have
taken some steps to increase shareholder power versus management.236  All
that said, corporate misconduct continues to make headlines and trigger
shareholder suits, demonstrating that all these measures simply reduce
rather than eliminate the problems created by separating ownership and con-
trol.  So while a corporate structure could be used to impose various duties,
and director and officer roles could be allocated among funder and claimant
to structure decisionmaking power and authority to minimize conflicts,
unless the funder and the claimant held all or essentially all the shares of the
corporation, the conflict minimization would be imperfect at best.
4. Limited Liability Companies
These entities are far newer and far more flexible than corporations.
The flexibility extends to the degree of separation of ownership and control.
Flexibility in LLCs also means that intra-company relationships can be struc-
tured relatively free from significant statutory and caselaw-imposed fiduciary
duties and other requirements.  The de facto deregulatory effects of the LLC
form account for its popularity in recent years.237  The great flexibility to
embrace or reject the conflict-minimizing duties and doctrines that come
with more traditional business forms, however, places in doubt the likely
effectiveness of this form in minimizing the problems created by the separa-
tion of ownership and control beyond what sheer bargaining power already
affords contracting parties.
While the rise of the LLC and the high likelihood that this business form
will be popular in this context—as it has increasingly been in others—raises
questions about the effectiveness of business entities to minimize problems
235 See George J. Siedel, Close Corporation Law: Michigan, Delaware and the Model Act, 11
DEL. J. CORP. L. 383, 395–96 (1986).  A corporation with such few shareholders could be
best styled as a close corporation because of the flexibility gained.  Further, a close corpo-
ration could flatten management by eliminating the board of directors, increasing effi-
ciency.  In these ways close corporations could mimic the advantages of partnerships while
adding the benefit of limited liability. See id.
236 See supra text accompanying note 24.
237 On the rise of the LLC, see RIBSTEIN, supra note 229, at 119–25.  On the LLC’s
deregulatory effects as a main reason for this rising tide, see id. at 119–23, 143–47.
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arising from the separation of ownership and control, it is important to note
that the type of entities used and their internal governance arrangements in
the litigation finance context can be dictated or at least affected by court
orders as to the form of settlement structure where a settlement is court-
supervised.  Court supervision, in turn, is likely to play an increasingly impor-
tant role as defendants and judges become more aware of litigation finance
and seek, respectively, to bring the fact of financing to light and to submit
finance arrangements to court scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
The legal ethics paradigm, while superficially very attractive given cer-
tain similarities between contingency attorneys and funders, proves, upon
closer consideration, to fall woefully short in explaining and addressing the
economic reality of litigation finance.  Consequently, it leads to both over-
and under-regulation of the practice and falls short in recognizing and
addressing the problem of the separation of ownership and control of legal
claims.  The legal ethics paradigm also masks the full spectrum of possible
deal structures that market players are already experimenting with in the
marketplace that is the focus of this Article: commercial claims brought by
sophisticated plaintiffs such as corporations, sovereigns, and wealthy
individuals.
A better view would replace litigation-finance-as-champerty as the
organizing idea in the literature and jurisprudence with litigation-finance-as-
finance as the organizing idea.  What follows, dubbed here “the incorpora-
tion paradigm,” better fits the realities of deals actually undertaken by various
market participants and brings a centuries-old paradigm of thought on how
to address, i.e., minimize or even solve (but if mismanaged, exacerbate),
each and every problem that stems from what is now reframed as the prob-
lem of the separation of ownership and control of legal claims.  These
problems are, in a nutshell: (1) extreme conflicts of interests; (2) extreme
information asymmetries; (3) extreme uncertainty; and (4) inappropriate
commodification.  In addition, the incorporation paradigm simplifies the
analysis of the application of securities regulation to litigation finance
arrangements.
In addition to this transformation of litigation finance scholarship and
practice, the discussion of incorporation of legal claims contributes to the
scholarship on corporate law.  As we have seen, most of the claim incorpora-
tion deals have taken place in the context of mergers, acquisitions, or large
equity investments.  In those cases, claim incorporations have been under-
taken in order to resolve the hidden cost of litigation—the barriers that pric-
ing legal claims can place on such transactions because of the difficulty in
valuing legal claims.  These hidden costs, where they apply, dwarf the visible
costs of litigation, i.e., attorneys’ fees and legal expenses.  Finally, incorporat-
ing legal claims may also provide accounting benefits and may play a role in
corporate finance by allowing corporations (or governments) to monetize
claims that currently go unprosecuted.
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Fully commodifying commercial legal claims and providing for
enhanced liquidity through public trading of securities in the open market
on security exchanges can open up additional horizons beyond those this
Article explores or those alluded to in the preceding paragraph.  More analy-
sis can be done on the accounting and tax implications of the use of different
types of business entities and securities and on how different legal entities
may lend themselves to different forms of corporate governance cum litiga-
tion governance.  The full implications of understanding litigation finance
contracts as financial products and spun-off litigation from a regulatory per-
spective is a rich field to mine, and there can be little doubt that the analysis
herein will launch experimentation by market players and create new scena-
rios for courts to opine on.
